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Abstract
This Article, in Parts I-III, traces the development of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty
from the drafting of the Treaty, through discussions in the 1960s on their possible application to
mergers, to the Continental Can case in 1973 and its subsequent interpretation. Part IV examines
the Commission’s proposal for a regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings.
Part V explains the Commission’s practice in relation to joint ventures (partial mergers), tracing
the connection between this phenomenon and the merger problem. Finally, Part VI looks at recent
developments that demonstrate the currently unsatisfactory state of this are of the law.
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INTRODUCTION
It is no secret that the increasing number of concentra-
tions in the European Economic Community ("EEC" or "EC")
in recent years, and the EC Commission's relative powerless-
ness to control them, have caused concern in Brussels. In a
recent speech,' Commissioner Sutherland, the Commissioner
particularly responsible for competition matters, stated that if
the Council failed to reach a decision on the Commission's
proposal for a merger control regulation, the Commission
"must envisage alternative means of achieving Community-
wide merger control," including "direct application of the
rules of the Treaty" to mergers.2 In that context, it is interest-
ing to review those provisions in an historical perspective and
to see what their limitations may be.
This Article, in Parts 1-111, traces the development of Arti-
cles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty from the drafting of the
Treaty, through discussions in the 1960s on their possible ap-
plication to mergers, to the Continental Can case in 1973 and its
subsequent interpretation. Part IV examines the Commis-
sion's proposal for a regulation on the control of concentra-
tions between undertakings. Part V explains the Commission's
practice in relation to joint ventures (partial mergers), tracing
the connection between this phenomenon and the merger
problem. Finally, Part VI looks at recent developments that
demonstrate the currently unsatisfactory state of this area of
the law.
t A version of this Article will be published in 1987 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. (B.
Hawk ed. 1988). Copyright © Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 1988.
* Member, Legal Service of the Commission of the European Communities.
Opinions expressed are entirely personal. The author wishes to acknowledge her
indebtedness to Norbert Koch and Giuliano Marenco for benefits she has drawn from
many long discussions on areas touched on in this Article.
1. Address by Commissioner Sutherland, Comm'n Press Release, Meeting of Di-
rectors General of Competition, IP(87) 282 (July 1987) (available at the Fordham In-
ternational Law Journal office).
2. Id. at 7-8.
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I. THE TREATY
The starting point for any discussion of the treatment of
mergers3 and partial mergers under EEC law must be the ab-
sence of any specific provision for merger control in the EEC
Treaty. It does not seem open to doubt that this omission was
deliberate, since the same European states that concluded the
Treaty of Rome in 1957' had, six years earlier, included a spe-
cific provision in the European Coal and Steel Community
("ECSC") Treaty5 for the control of concentrations ("close-
knit combinations" in American terminology). A comparison
of Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty6 and Articles 85 and
86 of the EEC Treaty7 shows a considerable similarity of scope
as between Articles 85 and 65, both of which prohibit, broadly
speaking, agreements in restraint of trade. As between Arti-
cles 66 and 86, however, the difference is marked. Thus, Arti-
cle 66 provides for prior authorization by the High Authority
(now the EC Commission) of transactions above a certain
threshold that would bring about a "concentration" in the
Common Market, whether by way of merger, acquisition of
shares and assets, loan, contract, or any other means of con-
trol. Only the last paragraph of this article deals with the prob-
lem of controlling the behavior of an undertaking that already
occupies a dominant position on a given market. By contrast,
that is the exclusive concern of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty.
The stark contrast between these provisions, as well as the
3. It will be noted that in the Commission's 1966 study on the problem of con-
centration control, the word "merger" was given a technical meaning and distin-
guished from various ways in which one undertaking gained control of another. See
infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. The word "concentration" was used-and
is still used-by the Commission as the generic term covering all these situations.
However, as the word "merger" has since then come to have rather a broad meaning,
covering many situations in which two or more undertakings lose their economic
independence by effectively coming under joint control, in this Article, unless the
context indicates otherwise, the terms "merger" and "concentration" are used
largely interchangeably.
4. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-II) (official English trans.), 298 U.N.T.S. 11
(1958) (unofficial English trans.) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
5. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2 (Cmd. 5189) (official English trans.), 261 U.N.T.S. 140
(1957) (unofficial English trans.).
6. Id. at 57-66, 261 U.N.T.S. at 195-204.
7. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 32-33, 298 U.N.T.S. at
47-49.
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legislative history of the EEC Treaty, 8 appears to have con-
vinced legal writers in the late 1950s and early 1960s that it
was not the intention of the draftsmen of the EEC Treaty to
include a provision covering merger control9 and that they
had contented themselves with a prohibition on restrictive
agreements (and concerted practices) governing market behav-
ior (Article 85) and an instrument to control abuse of a domi-
nant position that already existed (Article 86), without at-
tempting to prevent such dominance from coming into exist-
ence in the first place. Legal commentators then and now have
remained unanimous as to the non-applicability of Article 86
to the acquisition or the existence of a dominant position.
This omission of a merger control provision from the
Treaty is not surprising, given European economic thinking at
that time. One of the main objectives of the EEC was to bring
about the economies of scale made possible by an enlarged Eu-
ropean market. Mergers-especially mergers across national
boundaries-were seen as part of the process of European in-
tegration and as necessary to enable European industry to
adapt to the new dimensions of the Common Market and to
compete effectively against large foreign (notably American)
enterprises.' 0 Against that background, the Member States
clearly did not wish to include in the Treaty any provision that
might inhibit such developments.
II. THE 1966 MEMORANDUM
The debate was reopened by the EC Commission in 1964
when it asked a group of academic experts to study "the rela-
8. The Report of the Messina Conference, which was the basis for the drafting of
the Treaty of Rome, suggested a system of concentration control, but this recom-
mendation was not followed by the negotiators. Declarations made by the German
and Dutch governments on ratification of the Treaty also indicate that this difference
from the ECSC Treaty was quite deliberate. See Hefermehl, Fusionen und Kon-
zernbildungen nach EWG-Vertrag, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR HANS CARL NIPPERDEY 781-83
(1965).
9. See, e.g., A. GLEISS & M. HIRsCH, EWG-KARTELLRECHT 100, 185 (2d ed. 1965);
J. TEMPLE LANG, THE COMMON MARKET AND COMMON LAW (1966); Everling,
.Die Europaische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG 253(J. Wohlfarth, U. Everling, H. Glaesner & R. Sprung eds. 1960); Hefermehl, supra
note 8, at 780; Thiesing, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG 279 (H. von der
Groeben & H. von Boeckh eds. 1959).
10. See von der Groeben, Competition Policy as Part of Economic Policy in the Common
Market, 1965 E.C. BULL. No. 8, at 5.
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tionship between policy on restrictive agreements (Article 85)
and the concentration of undertakings."' The conclusions of
these experts, together with those of the Commission itself,
were published by the Commission in 1966.12
A. Treatment of Article 85 in the 1966 Memorandum
The Commission concluded that Article 85 was not appli-
cable to concentrations, a term which was used to cover any
situation in which "several firms are brought together under a
single economic management at the expense of their economic
independence.' 1 3 The most important types of concentration
were said to be the acquisition of holdings by one company in
another, the total or partial acquisition of another company's
capital assets, and the merger of two or more legally independ-
ent companies into a new company. 14 The main reasons for
the non-applicability of Article 85 to such transactions were
presented as follows:
1. Since competition policy requires that restrictive agree-
ments (cartels) be prohibited as a rule, whereas concentrations
need only be forbidden exceptionally when they give rise to an
unacceptable degree of market power, the uniform application
of the same rule of prohibition to both would result in the ban-
ning of either too few cartels or too many concentrations.
2. It would not be possible to treat in the same way con-
centrations the economic effects of which were the same;
where there was no agreement between undertakings, such as
in the case of the purchase of shares on the stock exchange,
Article 85 could not apply. This exclusion covers not only
purchases of shares from private individuals on the stock ex-
change, but also the purchase by one firm of shares held by
another since, even if an "agreement" could be construed be-
tween them, they would be agreeing, not in their capacity as
undertakings on a given market, but as investors dealing in
shareholdings.
3. The criteria set out in Article 85(3) for exemption from
11. COMMISSION, COMPETITION SERIES No. 3, THE PROBLEM OF INDUSTRIAL CON-
CENTRATION IN THE COMMON MARKET 32 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 MEMORANDUM]
(unofficial English trans. available at the Fordham International Law Journal office).
12. See id.
13. Id. at 31.
14. Id. at 19-21.
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the prohibition of Article 85(1) are not suitable for concentra-
tions because:
a) the positive assessment required under Article
85(3)15 could not be made for most concentrations, since
the effects of such combinations cannot be judged a priori
as reliably as those of an agreement concerning a certain
course of conduct on the market;
b) the indispensability criterion of Article 85(3)(a) is
logically inapplicable to concentrations, which necessarily
involve a complete elimination of competition between
the undertakings concerned. To find that a merger was
indispensable to the benefits to be achieved, the Commis-
sion would have to say that they could not have been
achieved by less restrictive means, i.e., in this case by a car-
tel agreement, which would amount to an encouragement
of loose associations instead of mergers;
c) the nature of an exemption requires that it be ca-
pable of reexamination after a certain time to ensure that
the legal requirements continue to be satisfied. An ex-
emption must therefore be limited in time; reexamination
would be unsuitable for mergers, where a permanent
clearance needs to be given;
d) similarly, revocation of an exemption must be pos-
sible at any time when the conditions upon which it was
based cease to be fulfilled.
4. The absolute nullity of prohibited agreements pro-
vided for in Article 85(2) would not be a desirable legal conse-
quence of prohibited concentrations. 1 6
In concluding that Article 85 could not apply to mergers,
the Commission focused not on the literal language of the pro-
vision, but on its system and objectives. Because it was
designed to forbid restrictions on competition in the sense of
obligations entered into with respect to market practices, Arti-
cle 85 is structured as a prohibition in principle, with excep-
tions being made only on the basis of positive criteria. That is
to say, a restrictive agreement is forbidden (and is null and
void) unless exempted on the basis that it contributes to an
improvement in the production or distribution of goods or
15. For a discussion see infra pp. 259-60.
16. 1966 MEMORANDUM, supra note 11, at 33-35.
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that it helps to promote technical or economic progress, while
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. These
are the positive requirements of Article 85(3). The negative
requirements are that the agreement does not impose on the
undertakings concerned restrictions that are not indispensable
for the attainment of the positive objectives, and that it does
not afford them the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect to a substantial part of the products in question. In
relation to mergers, on the other hand, only a negative crite-
rion is appropriate, i.e., that excessive market power is not ob-
tained. There is no interest in preventing mergers below this
threshold. A merger control provision is, therefore, essentially
concerned with market structure.
The different approach of Article 85 is explained by the
fact that restrictive agreements are judged to be contrary to the
public interest (unless in a given case they can be shown to
have beneficial effects) even when no large amount of market
power is involved.' 7 That is because restrictions on competi-
tion, entailing as they do a diminution of entrepreneurial free-
dom of action, are seen as damaging the competitive process,
which works properly only when each market operator remains
free to pursue its own commercial interests. Since the greatest
efficiencies are deemed to be achieved through decentralized
planning by freely taken individual business decisions, any-
thing that constitutes a clog on businesses' freedom of action,
such as pricing or market-sharing agreements, brings ineffi-
ciencies onto the market and is therefore condemned in princi-
ple, subject to possible exemption. Agreements through
which mergers are brought about, on the other hand, do not
constitute an impediment to the entrepreneurial freedom of
action or decision making of economically independent plan-
ning centers, since by definition a merger eliminates economic
independence.
It is clear, therefore, that there are different underlying
considerations behind the EEC cartel prohibition as distin-
guished from those that are appropriate for merger control.
The structure of the legal provision simply reflects this differ-
ence in purpose. The EEC provisions are different from that
17. Id. at 34.
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of section 1 of the Sherman Act,' 8 which, with the overlay of
the rule of reason, has been allowed to apply to both mergers
and cartels. Judicial interpretation of section 1 may have led to
somewhat different treatment of loose associations and close-
knit combinations, but the criterion of legality has been a
purely negative one for both: the absence of a significant effect
on market competition. 19
Could the rule of reason approach make it possible to ap-
ply Article 85 to mergers? Needless to say, it has been sug-
gested that it would be possible to bring under Article 85(1)
only those merger agreements that threatened market struc-
tures, since only these would be considered restrictive of com-
petition. 20 However, in relation to these agreements, the diffi-
culty of applying the unsuitable criteria of Article 85(3) would
remain. So also would remain the problem of the nullity of
the agreements under Article 85(2), which the Commission re-
garded as an excessive consequence of the illegality of a
merger agreement, especially because of the danger that it
could go beyond the restoration of the status quo because of
the disappearance of the individual firms involved in a merger.
Even where this was not a problem (for example, where one
firm had bought a controlling shareholding in another), the
impact of nullity on property rights and the consequent uncer-
tainties would seem to be undesirable.
The real danger in "tinkering with the system" of Article
85 to force it to apply to mergers is that one would end up with
a distorted system. An agreement would only be brought
under paragraph 1 in order to be prohibited, for any accepta-
ble mergers would have been found to be "non-restrictive,"
and any that were treated as restrictive could not respectably
be exempted. This is true especially because of the indispens-
ability requirement, the requirement that competition not be
eliminated, and the requirement that consumers obtain a fair
share of the benefits of the agreement. If a merger agreement
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
19. Cf. Joliet, Monopolization and Abuse of Dominant Position, A Comparative Study of
the American and European Approaches to the Control of Economic Power, in COLLECTION
SCIENTIFIQUE DE LA FACULTt DE DROIT DE L'UNIVERSITt DE LIkGE, No. 31, at 278.
20. Id. at 279; see also Temple Lang, Regulating Multinational Corporate Concentra-
tion-the European Economic Community, 2 MICH. Y.B. INT'L L. STUD. 144, 151, 153
(1981) [hereinafter Temple Lang, Regulating Multinational Corporate Concentration].
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was brought under Article 85(1) precisely because it brought a
dangerous degree of concentration into the market, it would
be odd for the Commission then to find that it did not afford
the parties the possibility of eliminating competition in rela-
tion to a substantial part of the products in question. And how
could it be likely in such market conditions that the fruits of
improved efficiencies would be passed on to the consumer?
Thus, the whole logic of Article 85 would be distorted, and by
the very dubious step of bringing under its prohibition a whole
class of agreements that could not benefit from its exemption
provisions.
If, on the other hand, exemptions were wrested from Arti-
cle 85, as matters stand they would have to be of a limited du-
ration and revocable, especially because Regulation 17,21 the
regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86, so provides. It
seems, in fact, that the logic of Article 85 itself requires exemp-
tions to be dependent on the continuation of the benefits of
the agreement and of the factual situation upon which an ex-
emption is based, so that it is not correct to say that the tempo-
rary and revocable nature of an exemption derives only from
the implementing legislation. But even if this were not so, and
if new implementing legislation were introduced pursuant to
Article 87 to cover mergers specifically, the major problems
would remain: only concentrations resulting from an agree-
ment between undertakings could be caught, so that the law
would not be uniformly applied; agreements would be null and
void; the exemption criteria would be unusable; and, last but
not least, what would happen in relation to "old" agreements?
As the Commission pointed out in the 1966 Memoran-
dum, "the effects of all concentrations effected in the past en-
dure. ' '2 2 What would be the consequence of the nullity of all
the past agreements that brought them about? Under the
Bosch 23 doctrine, it could perhaps be (adventurously) argued
that until appropriate implementing legislation was enacted,
Article 85 would not be applicable to render the agreements
21. Council Regulation No. 17, OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 87, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2401 [hereinafter Regulation 17].
22. 1966 MEMORANDUM, supra note 11, at 35.
23. De Gues v. Bosch, Case 13/61, 1962 E.C.R. 45, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8003; see also Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin-Janssen (No. 2), Case 48/72, 1973
E.C.R. 77, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8170.
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illegal and void. However, from the moment of that enact-
ment, Article 85 would apply in full force to all agreements still
producing their effects on the market place, that is to say, to all
past agreements. Even if they were all notified, and even if a
new theory of "provisional validity" were developed (so that
agreements that had been notified could not be treated as void
until the Commission had decided whether or not to grant an
exemption), once a negative decision had been made, they
would be void with retroactive effect to the date of coming into
force of the new Regulation.
In short, it seems to have been with good reason that the
Commission concluded in 1966:
To sum up, it may be stated that the distinction generally
made in the treatment of cartels and concentrations is nec-
essary and that, for the reasons mentioned, it is not possible
to apply Article 85 to agreements whose purpose is the ac-
quisition of total or partial ownership of firms or the reor-
ganization of the ownership of firms (merger, acquisition of
holdings, purchase of part of the assets).24
It added, however:
If, after the concentration process, several economi-
cally independent firms continue to exist (for example, in
the case of joint ventures), it will be necessary to examine
carefully' whether, apart from changes in ownership, the
participating enterprises have not entered into agreements
or concerted practices, within the meaning of Article 85(1).
Furthermore, Article 85(1) continues to be applicable if
the agreement does not result in a permanent change in
ownership but only a co-ordination of the market behaviour
of firms remaining economically independent. In such
cases, the arguments that militate against an application of
Article 85 to concentrations are without force. The situa-
tion in such a case is actually that of a cartel, and not that of
a reorganization of ownership.2 5
B. Treatment of Article 86 in the 1966 Memorandum
For the Commission, then, Article 85 applied only to
agreements governing the market behavior of enterprises and
24. 1966 MEMORANDUM, supra note 11, at 36.
25. Id.
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not to agreements whereby a structural change in their organi-
zation was brought about. In relation to Article 86, however,
the conclusion of the study was that this article could apply to
concentrations where the effect of a concentration was the mo-
nopolization of a market. It was pointed out that, unlike Arti-
cle 66 of the ECSC Treaty, Article 86 does, in principle, permit
the existence of a dominant position on a given market, since all
that is prohibited is the abuse of such dominance. The Com-
mission felt, however, that where an already dominant enter-
prise combined with another in such a way that there was a
complete elimination of competition on a particular market,
the abusive exploitation of a dominant position had occurred.
This was felt to be especially true because the monopolistic po-
sition resulting from such fusion was likely to have the same
harmful effects as practices specifically mentioned in Article 86
as being prohibited, e.g., limitation of production, markets or
technical development to the prejudice of consumers. Such ef-
fects result because:
A monopolistic situation removes incentives to technical
progress. It often leads to a limitation of production with
the aim of reaping maximum profits, through prices that are
higher than they would be on a market with oligopolistic
competition and with a level of production that would be
higher on account of such competition.26
It may be thought that the Commission's position was not
entirely consistent. In relation to Article 86 it emphasized the
potential similarity of results between a structural change on the
market and the individual behavior of a dominant enterprise.
However, it has often been pointed out that similar effects
from a market point of view may be brought about either by a
high degree of concentration or by a cartel,2 7 but this had not
26. Id. at 40.
27. Schapiro notes that the German Federal Cartel Office, in its 1959 Report,
emphasized that "business acquisitions can as effectively restrain competition as can
cartels. There is thus a danger that the curbing of contracutal restraints on competi-
tion may merely lead to a shift from cartels to consolidation" of economic power.
Schapiro, The German Law Against Restraints of Competition-Comparative and International
Aspects(pt. 1), 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 46 n.274 (1962). Much earlier, in the U.S. Hard-
wood case of 1921, Justice Brandeis pointed out that the participants in the Open
Price Plan of the Association, which had been declared by the majority of the Court
to be an unlawful restraint of trade, might have entered "the inviting field of consoli-
dation," and "through the formation of a consolidated company and the distribution
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sufficed to lead the Commission to the conclusion that Article
85 was applicable to concentrations. Not having gone down
this road in relation to Article 85, it is not clear why the Com-
mission should have done so in relation to Article 86, although
it is true that a number of the obstacles that it found to lie in
the way of the application of Article 85 to concentrations did
not exist in relation to Article 86.
There was no problem of having to distinguish between
situations in which a merger came about as a result of an
agreement between enterprises and those in which it did not,
and the distinction between "old" and "new" agreements did
not exist. The difficulties relating to the criteria for exemption
and to the limited period of an exemption and its revocability
also did not arise. Moreover-and this seems to have been an
important consideration-in the application of Article 86 the
legality of mergers would not depend on a positive assessment
of each one, but would be judged according to a negative crite-
rion, i.e., the absence of an improper exploitation of a domi-
nant position, meaning in this case the acquisition of monop-
oly power. The ban would thus apply only in "rare, excep-
tional cases ' 28 and for most concentrations no notification
would be necessary. Finally, the Commission stressed that:
As for the legal consequences of an infringement of Article
86, Article 3 of Regulation No 17 gives the Commission the
power either to send the firm concerned a recommendation
that they end the infringement, or to require them to do so
through a decision. 29
The absence of an automatic nullity provision in Article 86 was
therefore also considered important.
However, on the substantive question of the proper scope
of Article 86, the Commission did not at all explain why the
expression "abuse . . . of a dominant position" in Article 86
should not be given its most obvious meaning, that of an abuse
organically connected with the phenomenon of dominance. A
straightforward reading of the text of Article 86 would seem
of certificates of stock to the shareholders of the constituent companies, have accom-
plished what was forbidden by direct agreement." Handler, Industrial Mergers and the
Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 179, 179 (1932) (discussing American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 418-19 (1921) (Brandeis,J., dissenting)).
28. 1966 MEMORANDUM, supra note 11, at 37.
29. Id.
1988] 2 5
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clearly to indicate that it was intended to prohibit those harm-
ful forms of conduct that might be possible for a dominant un-
dertaking precisely because of its dominance. Of course, any
firm, dominant or otherwise, can merge with another. This is
not a type of behavior rendered possible by dominance and
would not therefore have appeared at first glance to be the ob-
ject of Article 86. It may be thought surprising that no expla-
nation of its contrary approach was put forward by the Com-
mission, but no doubt this reflected its recognition that policy
considerations (the importance of having some kind of merger
control) would have to prevail over technical niceties.
A further problem with the Commission's logic is its ac-
knowledgement that Article 86 allows the acquisition of a dom-
inant position, implying that the accumulation of market power
is not in itself unlawful, followed by the conclusion that such
accumulation is unlawful at the point where it results in the
complete elimination of competition. This conclusion was said
to be justified by reference to the objectives of the Treaty. In
particular, it was pointed out that under Article 85(3)(b) a re-
strictive agreement could not be exempted if it might result in
the elimination of competition with respect to a substantial
part of the products in question. It was felt that Article 86
should be interpreted so as to bring about the same result, i.e.,
the maintenance of an effective competitive structure. How-
ever, it has been pointed out that there is only a difference of
degree between the concept of market dominance (which is
permitted) and monopoly, and that the dangers perceived by
the Commission as inherent in monopoly already exist when a
firm is dominant." The same commentator also argued per-
suasively that Article 86 is not directed against a probability of
abuse, but against actual exploitation of market power to the
detriment of consumers.3'
III. THE CONTINENTAL CAN DECISION
Whatever its imperfections, the Commission's approach to
concentrations under Article 86 was upheld by the Court of
Justice on the first (and only) occasion that it was asked to pro-
nounce on it.
30. Joliet, supra note 19, at 292.
31. Id. at 292-93.
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In 1972 the Commission decided that a U.S.-based manu-
facturer of metal containers, Continental Can, had abused its
dominant position on the German market (held through a ma-
jority-owned subsidiary SLW) by acquiring an additional 81%
shareholding in the capital of the principal Benelux manufac-
turer of metal containers for meat and fish (TDV), in which it
already held a 10% share.12 Having defined the relevant prod-
uct markets as those for metal containers for meat products,
metal containers for fish products, and metal lids, the Commis-
sion decided that by acquiring control of TDV, Continental
Can had virtually eliminated all competition in those product
lines in a "substantial part" of the Common Market, i.e., an
area covering all of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxem-
bourg and the northern and central parts of Germany.33 This
finding was based on the view that SLW and TDV were capable
of competing on this geographic market, even though at the
time of the acquisition SLW sold only on the German market
and TDV on the Benelux. Continental Can appealed the Com-
mission's decision to the Court ofJustice. The Court annulled
the decision for lack of adequate definition of the product mar-
ket and in particular for the lack of consideration of supply-
side substitution.3 4 However, it upheld the Commission's view
that Article 86 applies to certain mergers:
[A]buse may... occur if an undertaking in a dominant posi-
tion strengthens such position in such a way that the degree
of dominance reached substantially fetters competition, i.e.,
that only undertakings remain in the market whose beha-
viour depends on the dominant one.3 5
In reaching this conclusion, the Court evidently had to reject
the argument that Article 86 is concerned only with the ex-
ploitative behavior of a dominant firm, and not with structural
changes in the market. In this regard it said: "The distinction
between measures which concern the structure of the under-
taking and practices which affect the market cannot be decisive,
for any structural measure may influence market conditions, if
it increases the size and the economic power of the undertak-
32. Continental Can, O.J. L 7/25 (1972), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9481.
33. Id. 1 24, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9481, at 9032.
34. Europemballage Corp. v. Commission & Continental Can Co., Case 6/72,
1973 E.C.R. 215, 247-49, $$ 33-37, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 9481, at 8302.
35. Id. at 245, $ 26, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8171, at 8300.
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ing."36
The Court also specifically rejected the argument referred
to above that, in order for Article 86 to be infringed, there
must be a causal connection between the dominance and the
abuse. 37 It based this rejection on the idea that Article 86 ap-
plies not only to practices that damage consumers directly (ex-
ploitative behavior) but also to those that are detrimental to
them through their impact on an effective competition struc-
ture.3 8 In other words, in order to apply Article 86 to struc-
tural measures that threaten to eliminate competition, the
Court had to "break the link" between dominance and abuse.
It has been pointed out that the Court's attitude in this regard
was a reflection of its policy concern to apply Article 86 to cer-
tain mergers, and that therefore the breaking of the link be-
tween dominance and abuse should be regarded as limited to
the merger-type fact situation. 39 This author respectfully
agrees. If it were to be otherwise, the sacrifice in terms of the
internal logic of Article 86 would be great indeed.40
A. The Legal Position Established by Continental Can
The Court's dictum as to the circumstances in which abuse
may occur seems to echo the Commission's view that Article
86 applies only to those mergers that have an ultimately dam-
aging effect on the competitive structure of a market by effec-
tively eliminating workable competition. The Court's refer-
ence to a "substantial fettering" of competition and its subse-
quent explanation of this concept may perhaps be seen as a
gloss upon the view of the Commission set out in the 1966
Memorandum:
The limit set by Article 86 for a market-dominating en-
36. Id. at 243, 21, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171, at 8299.
37. Id. at 245, 27, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171, at 8300.
38. Id., 26, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171, at 8300.
39. 2 B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTI-
TRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 662 (2d ed. 1985).
40. The Court's dictum in Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, Case 85/76,
1979 E.C.R. 461, 541, 91, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8527, at 7553, to the effect
that an abuse can exist even where it has not been brought about by the use of eco-
nomic power, should be read as related to the applicant's argument in that case that
no pressure had been brought to bear on the customers to adopt a system of fidelity
rebates, since they themselves saw such a system as advantageous. This is a different
argument from that of causality.
EEC MERGERS AND JOINT VENTURES
terprise with regard to concentration can be determined
only in a given case in the light of the market situation. In
general, only the following may be stated: the closer a firm
occupying a dominant position comes to creating a monop-
oly through mergers with or absorption of other firms, and
the more it thus jeopardizes the purchasers', suppliers', and
ultimate consumers' freedom of choice, the more likely it is
that it thereby enters the sphere of improper exploitation.
When examining the determining factors in each indi-
vidual case, the key point will be whether the disappearance
of smaller firms really limits competition in such a way as to
conflict with the arrangement provided for in the Treaty.
This condition can be considered to be met only where a
dominant firm strengthens its position through concentra-
tion to the point where, in violation of the concept on which
the Treaty and particularly Article 86(b) is based and to the
detriment of consumers, suppliers and dealers, it thereby
creates a monopolistic situation which prevents competition
from functioning. In any evaluation of the determining fac-
tors, it should be borne in mind that the disappearance of
smaller firms may in fact not affect competition at all. This
may also apply in respect of a small firm, which, while com-
peting effectively at present, were to disappear from the
market in the near future, with or without a concentration. 4'
At first glance the result of Continental Can appears to be
very much what the Commission indicated it intended to estab-
lish via Article 86-a limited form of merger control, which op-
erates only in "rare and exceptional" cases-situations where
such an ultimate degree of market power is acquired that the
competitive structure must inevitably be damaged unless inter-
vention is possible to prevent it. Subsequent pronouncements
of the Commission, however, have reflected its view that the
scope of the merger control possibilities established by Conti-
nental Can is broader than might have first appeared. Thus, in
its Tenth Report on Competition Policy (covering the year
1980), the Commission pointed to the broader concept of
abuse that had been developed by the Court ofJustice in cases
subsequent to Continental Can (cases concerned with "behav-
ioral" rather than "structural" abuses).42 It indicated that it
41. 1966 MEMORANDUM, supra note 11, at 41.
42. Paragraph 21 of the Commission's Tenth Report on Competition Policy
(1981) refers to the following cases: Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, Case
19881 269
270 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 11:255
was this broader concept, under which any further weakening
of the structure of competition brought about by the conduct
of an already dominant undertaking could amount to an abuse
of dominance, to which regard was now being had in the con-
text of mergers rather than the "elimination of residual com-
petition" approach of Continental Can. Thus, the Tenth Report
states:
In assessing conditions for applying Article 86 to merg-
ers, particularly as regards the concepts of dominant posi-
tion and abuse, the Commission also based its action on the
line taken in later judgments in the United Brands and
Hoffmann-La Roche cases.
A dominant position can generally be said to exist once
a market share to the order of 40% to 45% is reached.
Although this share does not in itself automatically give
control of the market, if there are large gaps between the
position of the firm concerned and those of its closest com-
petitors and also other factors likely to place it at an advan-
tage as regards competition, a dominant position may well
exist. Strengthening by means of merger is likely to consti-
tute an abuse if any distortion of the resulting market struc-
ture interferes with the maintenance of remaining competi-
tion (which has already been weakened by the very exist-
ence of this dominant position) or its development. Such
an effect depends, in particular, on the change in the rela-
tive market strength of the participants after the merger, i.e.
the position of the new unit in relation to remaining com-
petitors.43
It will be noted that this more expansive approach to the
applicability of Article 86 to mergers is based upon a lowering
of the threshold of both dominance and abuse. In Continental
Can the dominant position found by the Commission was
based upon market shares as high as 80% to 90%, and never
less than 50%. Thus, an undertaking can more readily be
found to be dominant and, once that finding has been made,
can be prevented from increasing its dominance.
85/76, 1979 E.C.R. 461, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8527; Hugin v. Commission,
Case 22/78, 1979 E.C.R. 1869, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8524; United Brands
Co. v. Commission, Case 27/76, 1978 E.C.R. 207, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8429; Suiker Unie v. Commission (Sugar Cartel Case), Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111,
113 and 114/73, 1975 E.C.R. 1663, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8334.
43. COMM'N, TENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 150 (1981).
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It has been questioned whether the Commission is right to
extrapolate from cases concerned with anti-competitive behav-
ior principles to be applied to the strengthening of a dominant
position through structural change.44 An indication of the dif-
ficulty of applying the same rules to different factual situations
appears from the passage in the Court's judgment in Hoffmann-
La Roche upon which the broader test of abuse is largely based:
The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to
the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position
which is such as to influence the structure of the market
where as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in
question, the degree of competition is weakened and which,
through recourse to methods different from those which condition nor-
mal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions
of commercial operations, has the effect of hindering the main-
tenance of the degree of competition still existing in the
market or the growth of that competition.
4 5
Can mergers be said to fall within the category of aberrant
competitive methods referred to by the Court? In reality their
nature is different from the "methods" the Court had in mind,
which were anti-competitive or exploitative techniques in the
sense of market behavior.
The Commission's approach entails treating mergers (at
least certain mergers) as "methods different from those which
condition normal competition." The correctness of this equa-
tion of dissimilar phenomena may be questioned, especially
because it does not seem warranted by the Commission's usual
insistence on looking to results rather than form and focusing
on the likely market effect of any given behavior rather than on
its formal classification. In fact, the effects of a merger, at least
a merger that does not result in a monopoly, are not the same
as those of anti-competitive behavior on the market. Whereas
it was possible for the Commission in 1966 to argue that the
elimination of all competition from a given market could have
the same harmful effects as market practices specifically forbid-
den by Article 86, the same cannot be said of a merger that
increases a firm's market share from, say, 45% to 55%. It is
44. See Reynolds, Merger Control in the EEC, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 407, 409-10
(1983).
45. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, Case 85/76, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 91,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8527, at 7553 (emphasis added).
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generally not possible to predict a specific harm that will result
from such a strengthening of market position, even though it
inevitably means a lessening of the amount of competition faced
by the "dominant" undertaking.
It may be, however, that in practice the Commission's
broader approach does not represent a very great departure
from the Continental Can doctrine. The somewhat dense lan-
guage of the extract from the Tenth Report on Competition
Policy may be interpreted as meaning that the Commission
would consider an abuse to have occurred only when some
"distortion" was apparent in the market structure after, and as
a result of, the merger, such that the remaining competition
could not be expected to be maintained or developed. In
other words, it would not be enough that the merger itself had
diminished competition in a quantitative sense; it would fur-
ther be necessary to establish that such harm had been done to
the structure of the market that it was unlikely that the remain-
ing degree of competition could hold its own against the domi-
nant enterprise. On that construction, the new formula is sim-
ply a more sophisticated presentation of the concern of both
the Commission and the Court in Continental Can-that such a
degree of dominance should not be achieved as to amount to
an effective elimination of competition. Such an approach
would not ignore particular strengths of small competitors, or
the importance of potential competition. As to the apparent
lowering of the threshold of dominance, the analysis of each
case will depend on all the, facts of that case; it is true that fac-
tors other than market share have a considerable role to play in
determining whether a dominant position exists. It may be
that the "new" approach is once again simply a more refined
explanation of the analytical process necessary to make that
determination, under which advantages such as a considerable
leadership margin, size of competitors, technological exclusivi-
ties and barriers to entry are considered together with market
share in assessing market power.
B. Inadequacies of Article 86 as an Instrument of Merger Control
On the basis outlined above, that the heart of the matter
remains the elimination-of-competition concern of Continental
Can, it would appear that the merger control instrument held
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by the Commission at present is of somewhat limited applica-
tion. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that the Commis-
sion has not formally condemned a single merger since Conti-
nental Can. It has, it is true, examined a number of mergers
and proposed mergers, 46 and in at least two cases 47 a proposal
for an acquisition was considerably modified as a result of
Commission intervention. In another,48 a proposed takeover
was abandoned after the Commission had informed the parties
of a complaint and warned them of possible interim measures.
In yet a third,49 the acquiring company divested itself of its in-
terests in the relevant market in the course of a Commission
inquiry. No doubt there may be numerous other cases in
which proposed mergers or acquisitions have not gone ahead
simply because of an awareness of the existence of Article 86
and the Continental Can doctrine. It is also true that certain
Member States have strong merger control systems that may
make it unnecessary for the Commission to intervene in a
given case.
Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that as an instrument
for merger control, the Article 86 weapon leaves much to be
desired. First, it can be used only where one undertaking al-
ready holds a dominant position. Undesirable market power
resulting from the merger of two or more undertakings, none
of which was dominant to begin with, is beyond its reach. The
idea of a dominant position held jointly by more than one firm
46. See Kaiser/Estel, Couts Patons Ltd./Giterman & Co., Fichtel &
Sachs/Huret, discussed in COMM'N, NINTH REPORT ON COMEPTITION POLICY 131-133
(1980); Pilkington/BSN-Gervais-Danone, Baxter Travenol Laboratories/Smithkline
RIT, discussed in COMM'N, TENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 152-154, 157
(1981); Amicon Corporation/Fortia AB & Wright Scientific Ltd., discussed in COMM'N,
ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 112 (1982); Eagle Star/Allianz Ver-
sicherung, British Sugar/Berisford, discussed in COMM'N, TWELFTH REPORT ON COMPE-
TITION POLICY 4 104-106 (1983); Berisford/Napier Brown, discussed in COMM'N,
THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 166 (1984); Mecaniver/PPG, Philip
Morris/Rembrandt/Rothmans, Ashland Oil Inc./Cabot Co., Pont i Mous-
son/Stanton & Stavely, discussed in COMM'N, FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 4 97-98, 109-110 (1985).
47. Pilkington, discussed in COMM'N, TENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
152 (1981); Philip Morris, discussed in COMM'N, FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 98 (1985).
48. Amicon, discussed in COMM'N, ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
112 (1982).
49. Berisford-Napier Brown, discussed in COMM'N, THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COM-
PETITION POLICY 166 (1984),
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being abused by their merger could only be relevant where,
prior to merger, there were such links between the firms that it
would be possible to regard their position as in some sense
"joint." Not only would such a case be rare, but one may won-
der whether the competition loss resulting from the merger of
such firms would be sufficiently great to bring Article 86 into
play. Second, Article 86 reaches only an extreme form of con-
centration that results in the elimination of effective competi-
tion. A classical system of merger control imposes no such
limitation, for it is evident that concentrations of market power
may be undesirable short of the point of leaving only those
undertakings in the market that are dependent on a dominant
undertaking. Third, there is no power to intervene before a
merger has taken place in order to prevent it, although it has
been suggested that the Commission could block a merger by
means of interim measures, 50 nor is there any system of prior
notification of proposed mergers.
Finally, the bluntness of Article 86 as an instrument for
merger control is illustrated by the absence from it of any pos-
sibility of exemption for reasons not connected with competi-
tion. Unlike the situation that would be created if the Commis-
sion's proposed Regulation were to become law,5 ' under Arti-
cle 86 a merger either involves such damage to the competitive
structure that it is prohibited or it does not. There is no room
for balancing its anti-competitive effects against social or re-
gional needs and allowing the latter to prevail in certain cir-
cumstances. It is true that the Commission announced in its
Tenth Report on Competition Policy that it was "examining"
the possibility of taking into account, in its assessments of
mergers under Article 86, "the impact of any prohibition on
industrial development and its social consequences. '5 2 How-
ever, it is not clear how this could be done without grafting
even more alien elements onto the body of Article 86 and ren-
dering this area of the law even less certain than it is at present.
50. See Reynolds, supra note 44, at 415-19; Temple Lang, The Powers of the Com-
mission to Order Interim Measures in Competition Cases, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 49, 54
(1981) [hereinafter Temple Lang, Powers of the Commission].
51. Under Article 1(3) of the proposed Regulation, as amended in 1984, O.J. C
51/8 (1984), a concentration that would otherwise be prohibited may be exempted if
it is "indispensable to the attainment of a priority of the Community."
52. COMM'N, TENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 21 (1981).
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C. Remedies
Since the evil to be remedied is the acquisition of excess
market power, the normal remedy will be divestiture. In Conti-
nental Can the Commission ordered divestiture and required
the company to submit proposals to the Commission within six
months. The Court has made it clear that the powers held by
the Commission under Article 3 of Regulation 17 (to order an
infringement to be brought to an end) include the power to
order positive steps to be taken where this is necessary. 53
It is, however, clearly unsatisfactory, both from the Com-
mission's point of view and that of businesses, that mergers
should have to be "unscrambled" after they have been com-
pleted. A more rational system-such as that which the Com-
mission has proposed to the Council of Ministers-would pro-
vide for the prior notification to the Commission of mergers
above a certain level of economic importance, and give the
Commission a definite period within which to react. Of course,
there is no reason why firms proposing a merger should not
informally sound out the Commission about its likely reaction,
but the informal reassurance they might thus obtain is no sub-
stitute for complete legal security. 4 It has also been pointed
out that the lack of certainty in the present situation and the
prospect of having to try to unwind a completed merger may
have the result that mergers are called off or substantially mod-
ified on the basis of an informal indication from the Commis-
sion that it considers Article 86 to apply, and that this will hap-
pen without the Commission having had to carry out the thor-
ough market analysis required by Continental Can for a formaldecision. 55 The danger is thus that the fear of Article 86 will
achieve more than Article 86 could have achieved itself, and
that a body of quasi-case law will be built up on the basis of
these "settlements" of cases, the exact basis or justification for
which will not be clear. It must be added, however, that the
same thing happens-and must inevitably happen-in relation
to classical infringements of the competition rules. Although
53. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA v. Commission (Commerical Solvents),
Cases 6 and 7/73, 1974 E.C.R. 223, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8209.
54. See Temple Lang, Regulating Multinational Corporate Concentration, supra note
20, at 146.
55. See Reynolds, supra note 44, at 414.
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the Commission's settlement practice has been criticized, 56 it is
hard to see how an enforcement authority with limited re-
sources can hope to deal with its workload without having
some recourse to informal methods. The problem is particu-
larly acute, however, in the merger context, where there has
been one formal decision fifteen years ago and no clear juris-
prudential developments since then to guide companies' law-
yers in advising their clients.
D. Interim Measures
The question whether the Commission may intervene by
way of interim measures to prevent a merger taking place is of
considerable importance because of the difficulties of "un-
scrambling" a merger once it has been effected. The basis for
such action by the Commission would be the Court's decision
in the Camera Care case.5 7 This case held that the Commission
has power to order interim measures in competition cases to
preserve the status quo pending a final decision. In that case,
the Court stated:
[T]he Commission must also be able, within the bounds of
its supervisory task conferred upon it in competition mat-
ters by the Treaty and Regulation No 17, to take protective
measures to the extent to which they might appear indis-
pensable in order to avoid the exercise of the power to
make decisions given by Article 3 from becoming ineffectual
or even illusory because of the action of certain undertak-
ings. The powers which the Commission holds under Arti-
cle 3(1) of Regulation No 17 therefore include the power to
take interim measures which are indispensable for the effec-
tive exercise of its functions and, in particular, for ensuring
the effectiveness of any decisions requiring undertakings to
bring to an end infringements which it has found to exist.58
Reynolds believes it is "clear" that this decision, together
with Continental Can, makes it possible for the Commission to
56. See, e.g., van Bael, The Antitrust Settlement Practice of the EC Commission, 23 COM-
MON MKT. L. REV. 68 (1986); van Bael, Comment on the EEC Commission 's Antitrust Settle-
ment Practice: The Shortcircuiting of Regulation 17, Swiss REV. INT'L COMPETITION L.,
Oct. 1984, at 67.
57. Camera Care Ltd v. Commission, Case 792/79 R, 1980 E.C.R. 119, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8645.
58. Id. at 131, 18, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8645, at 7644.
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order interim measures to prevent a merger that is likely to
constitute an infringement of Article 86.59 Temple Lang also
has said that mergers and acquisitions might be halted by in-
terim measures. 60 This path, however, does not seem to be
quite clear of obstacles.
Both the indications given by the Court in Camera Care, as
well as subsequent guidelines issued by the Commission6 and
legal writings, 62 show that there are limits on the circum-
stances in which the power to order interim measures may be
used. The first requirement is that there should be a fairly
strong prima facie case that a violation of competition law has
occurred. This is only to be expected, given the extreme nature
of the right to impose certain behavior on an undertaking
before all the procedure and investigation leading to a final
decision have been completed, and given also that the power
to order interim measures is based on Article 3(1) of Regula-
tion No. 17, which reads: "Where the Commission, upon ap-
plication or upon its own initiative, finds that there is infringe-
ment of Article 85 or Article 86 of the Treaty, it may by deci-
sion require the undertakings or associations of undertakings
concerned to bring such infringement to an end."' 63 The clear
wording of Article 3(1), therefore, refers to the present exist-
ence of an infringement. It is true that the Court has already
been very flexible in its interpretation of this provision, since
in GVL v. Commission 6 1 it held that the Commission was entitled
to issue a decision making a finding of infringement on the ba-
sis of Article 3 even where the infringement in question had
ceased to exist. In that case, however, there had been an in-
fringement; in the context of a proposed merger, the infringe-
ment has yet to be committed. This is not merely a formal
argument, for to interpret Article 3(1) as if it read "where the
Commission ... finds that there is (probably about to be) in-
fringement" would be to alter radically the nature of the power
59. Reynolds, supra note 44, at 415.
60. Temple Lang, Powers of the Commission, supra note 50, at 54.
61. These guidelines as to the circumstances in which the Commission would
take interim measures are reproduced in C. KERSE, EEC ANTITRUST PROCEDURES
app.I, at 322 (1981).
62. See, e.g., id.; Temple Lang, Powers of the Commission, supra note 50.
63. Regulation 17, supra note 21, art. 3(1), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 88,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2401, at 1731 (emphasis added).
64. Case 7/82, 1983 E.C.R. 483, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8910.
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given to the Commission. No longer a power to make ex post
findings of infringement, it would become a power of preven-
tion. It must be doubted whether such an interpretation would
be justified.
It may be that in certain cases a number of steps would
have been taken preparatory to the actual transaction, such as
an agreement in principle between firms prior to actual merger
or steps preceding the purchase of shares from shareholders.
It is difficult to see, however, how a declaration of intent to
abuse can be equated with abuse.
Even if the two things could be equated, it would often be
difficult for the Commission to predict with a sufficient degree
of certainty that a proposed merger would result in an in-
fringement of Article 86. It must be remembered that it would
be called upon to make this assessment at a very early stage,
and before it had time to carry out a thorough analysis of all
the circumstances of the case.
The other requirements that must be fulfilled before in-
terim measures can be ordered are that the matter must be ur-
gent and that interim measures must be needed in order to
avoid serious and irreparable harm to the party seeking their
adoption, or which is intolerable for the public interest. If
granted, the measures must be of a temporary and conserva-
tory nature, and go no further than is needed to deal with the
situation. These requirements are also likely to be difficult to
fulfill in a merger-type situation, which is quite different from
the situation in a case of anti-competitive abuse, such as a re-
fusal to supply that could immediately threaten the continued
presence of a competitor on the market. In the case of a
merger, the most likely complainants are competitors that are
unlikely to be able to demonstrate a probability of immediate
and irreparable damage to themselves. It would therefore only
be in an extreme case, where the market structure, and there-
fore the public interest, was gravely threatened, that the Com-
mission might consider the requirement of urgency to be ful-
filled. However, even in such a case, the damage might not be
considered irreparable since the Commission has the power to
remedy the anti-competitive effects of the merger by ordering
divestiture at the conclusion of its administrative proceedings.
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IV. THE PROPOSED REGULATION ON MERGER
CONTROL
It was recognition of the shortcomings of Article 86 as an
instrument of merger control, and of the need for a more sys-
tematic discipline, that led the Commission, shortly after the
Continental Can judgment, to place before the Council of Minis-
ters a proposal for a Regulation on the control of concentra-
tions between undertakings. 65 This proposal made reference
to the increasing degree of concentration in the Common Mar-
ket and to the danger that effective competition could thereby
bejeopardized. It recognized the limited nature of the powers
already held by the Commission under Article 86 to deal with
the problem and stressed in particular the need to be able to
deal systematically with mergers before they were put into effect.
It therefore invoked not only Article 87 but also Article 235,
under which the Community may give itself the powers of
action necessary for the attainment of the objectives of
the Treaty where the Treaty itself has not provided the neces-
sary powers.6 6 The Commission's proposal, as subsequently
amended, is essentially the following.
A. The Commission's Proposal
The Commission defined a concentration as taking place
where a person or an undertaking, or a group of persons or
undertakings, acquires control of one or several undertakings,
that is to say, they acquire the power to determine how one or
several undertakings shall operate. At least one of the under-
takings or groups of undertakings concerned must be estab-
lished in the Common Market.
1. Scope
The draft Regulation does not apply to concentrations
where the aggregate turnover of the participating undertakings
is less than 750 million ECU unless, irrespective of turnover in
65. Proposal for a Regulation (EEC) of the Council on the Control of Concen-
trations Between Undertakings, OJ. C 92/1 (1973). Discussion of this proposal is
accurate as of January 1988.
66. Article 3(f) of the EEC Treaty requires the Community to establish "a sys-
tem ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted." EEC Treaty,
supra note 4, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 3, 298 U.N.T.S. at 16.
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the market as a whole, the share in a substantial part of the
Common Market (which may be interpreted as meaning in any
sizeable Member State) is greater than 50%. 67 Neither does it
apply to concentrations that do not affect trade between Mem-
ber States.68
2. Incompatibility
A concentration is "incompatible with the Common Mar-
ket" if the undertakings concerned thereby acquire or enhance
the power to hinder effective competition in the Common Mar-
ket or in a substantial part thereof.69 However, there is a re-
buttable presumption that a concentration is compatible with
the Common Market where the market share of the goods or
services concerned accounts for less than 20% of the turnover
of identical or substitutable goods or services in the Common
Market or in a substantial part thereof.
70
The power to hinder effective competition is assessed at
Community level, and in this assessment particular account is
taken of the possibilities of choice available to suppliers and
consumers, the economic and financial power of the undertak-
ings concerned, the structure of the markets affected, interna-
tional competition, and supply and demand trends for the rele-
vant goods or services.7"
3. Possibility of Individual Exemption
An exemption may be granted in relation to a concentra-
tion that is indispensable to the attainment of a "priority of the
Community." Conditions and obligations may be attached to
such an exemption.72
4. Declaration of Incompatibility
Such a declaration is to be issued by the Commission
when the conditions of incompatibility are satisfied, and when
an exemption cannot be granted.7 3 It does not have the conse-
67. O.J. C 51/8 (1984), art. 1(2).
68. O.J. C 92/1 (1973), art. 1(1).
69. Id.
70. Oj. C 51/8 (1984), art. 1(I).
71. Id.
72. Id. art. 1(3).
73. O.J. C 92/1 (1973), art. 3(1)-(2).
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quence of rendering null and void the legal transactions upon
which the concentration is based. If the concentration has al-
ready been put into effect, the Commission may require divest-
iture or reparation of assets or any other measure that may be
necessary in order to restore conditions of effective competi-
tion.
5. Prior Notification
Before they are put into effect concentrations must be no-
tified to the Commission where the aggregate turnover of the
undertakings concerned is not less than one thousand million
ECU.74 However, the obligation does not apply if the turnover
of one of the undertakings concerned is less than thirty million
ECU. 75 (There is an option to notify the Commission of con-
centrations that fall outside the "obligatory notification"
category.) Notification has suspensory effect; the notified con-
centration may not be put into effect during the three months
following notification unless the Commission informs the un-
dertakings concerned before the end of that period that it is
not necessary to commence proceedings.76 Failure to notify
the Commission of a compulsorily notifiable concentration
may result in the imposition of a fine.77
6. Procedural Time Limits
The Commission has three months after notification
within which to decide whether to commence proceedings,
although this time limit may be extended with the consent of
the undertakings concerned.78 If it does not do so, and in the
absence of false or misleading information supplied with the
notification, the concentration is presumed to be compatible
with the Common Market.79 If the Commission does open
proceedings, its final decision must generally be issued within
a further nine months. 80
74. Id. art. 4(1).
75. O.J. C 51/8 (1984), art. 4(2).
76. Oj. C 92/1 (1973), art. 6(2).
77. Id. art. 13(2).
78. Id. art. 6(2).
79. Id. art. 6(4).
80. Id. art. 17(1).
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7. Fines
Penalties may be imposed for a number of procedural in-
fringements, and most importantly for concluding a concentra-
tion that the Commission has found to be incompatible with
the Common Market or that the Commission has ordered to be
suspended pending its final decision, or for doing so before
the expiration of the three month period in relation to a con-
centration about which the Commission has been notified.8'
In summary, it will be seen that the system envisaged by
the proposed Regulation is one of considerable flexibility and
sophistication. Below a certain threshold, mergers fall outside
its scope altogether; above a higher threshold, the Commission
must be notified; in between, no notification is necessary,
although in particular circumstances they might be found to be
incompatible with the Common Market. Clear procedural
rules are laid down. Provision is made for the situation in
which a merger has already happened before it comes to the
Commission's attention. Allowance is made for balancing
competing policy values. The system is neither one of prior
authorization comparable to the regime under the ECSC
Treaty, nor one of prohibition in principle. It is rather, as the
Third Report on Competition Policy put it, "a system where
incompatibility with the Common Market must be established
case by case after assessment by the Commission of whether
the concentration is liable to hinder effective competition in
the Common Market."8 2
B. Status of the Commission's Proposal
The draft Regulation was approved by the European Par-
liament on February 12, 1974,8' and by the Community's Eco-
nomic and Social Committee on February 28, 1974.4 It has
been substantially amended on three occasions since then, in
81. Id. art. 13(3).
82. COMM'N, THIRD REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 28 (1974). Lest this
sound alarmingly vague, it should be noted that a new Article (Article 22a) inserted
by the 1984 amendment provides for publication by the Commission of guidelines to
indicate "the circumstances in which mergers or concentrations will be subject to
examination or review by the Commission." OJ. C 51/8 (1984), art. 22a.
83. O.J. C 23/19 (1974).
84. O.J. C 88/19 (1974).
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198 1,85 1984,86 and 1986.87 However, in spite of various par-
liamentary questions and resolutions,88 the Council has not
made any real progress towards the adoption of the proposed
Regulation. This is somewhat surprising in view of the fact
that the Commission was encouraged to put forward its propo-
sal by the statement that emerged from the EEC Summit Con-
ference held in Paris from October 19 to 21, 1972, which re-
ferred to the problem of business concentration:
The Heads of State or of Government consider it necessary
to seek to establish a single industrial base for the Commu-
nity as a whole. This involves ... the formulation of meas-
ures to ensure that mergers affecting firms established in
the Community are in harmony with the economic and so-
cial aims of the Community, and the maintenance of fair
competition as much within the Common Market as in ex-
ternal markets in conformity with the rules laid down by the
Treaties. The Heads of State or Government further be-
lieved that it was desirable to make the widest possible use
of all the dispositions of the Treaties, including Article 235
of the EEC Treaty.89
However, it appears that a number of problems have pre-
vented a consensus from being reached in the Council. Gen-
eral reservations have been entered by two Member States,
although one of them has been withdrawn. The main difficul-
ties appear to have centered upon:
a. The legal basis for the Regulation (which is strange, given
the urging of the Paris Summit Statement, quoted above, to
make maximum use of Article 235).
b. The scope of the Regulation, for example, whether public
enterprises should be included.
85. Oj. C 36/3 (1982).
86. O.J. C 51/8 (1984).
87. O.J. C 324/5 (1986).
88. See, e.g., Written Question No. 225/79 (addressed to the Council), O.J. C
282/5 (1979), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,178; Written Question No. 67/80 (ad-
dressed to the Commission), O.J. C 167/28 (1980); Written Question No. 925/80
(addressed to the Commission), O.J. C 312/12 (1980), and Written Question No.
1129/80 (addressed to the Council), O.J. C 322/7 (1980); Parliamentary Resolution
on the Commission's Fifteenth Report on Competition Policy (1986), reproduced in the
annex to the Commission's SIXTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY (1987).
89. Final Declaration of the Conference of the Heads of State or of Govern-
ments of the Member States of the Enlarged Communities 7.
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c. The requirement of prior notification (there have been ob-
jections both to the principle and to the criteria proposed).
d. Possibilities of derogation: the concern here has related to a
possible clash between competition goals and other policy
objectives such as industrial, social, and regional concerns.
This point has been at least partly covered by the provision
for an exemption in the interests of "a priority of the Com-
munity."
e. Possible conflicts between the concerns of national and
Community competition authorities, in the sense that a na-
tional authority could not authorize a merger that was pro-
hibited under Community law. In the reverse situation,
where there was no objection to a merger under EEC law,
there is no reason why a national authority could not forbid
it on the basis of a stricter or otherwise different national
law, since the Community law position would be permissive
rather than obligatory. It has been suggested, however, that
where an agreement is accorded a positive exemption under
Community law, a Member State may not forbid it under
national law90 because such action could prejudice the uni-
form application of Community law, where for instance the
same agreement (or, mutatis mutandis, merger) was author-
ized in some Member States and forbidden in others be-
cause of the strict national laws of the latter. But since an
exemption has no binding force (enterprises being free to
take advantage of it or not as they please), it would be odd if
Member States were considered "bound" by it. An exemp-
tion is no more than the "waiving" of the incompatibility
that would otherwise be found to exist. The Commission
has no power to oblige a particular merger to take place,
and it is submitted that, even if the reasons for granting an
exemption are reasons of strong Community interest ("a
priority of the Community"), that cannot convert permis-
sion into obligation or oust national jurisdiction. Politically,
90. In its reply to Written Question No. 1508/81, O.J. C 85/6 (1982), the Com-
mission described exemptions pursuant to Article 85(3) as "Commission measures
which prevent the application of domestic competition law where this would have the
effect of prohibiting or annulling an agreement exempted under Article 85(3)." The
arguments for and against this approach may be found in C. KERSE, supra note 61, at
280-81. See also Koch, vor Article 85, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG 30 (E.
Grabitz ed. 1986).
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the Commission might want to encourage a particular
merger; legally, however, it can only remove obstacles
based on Community law. In the absence of Community
power to command, there is no conflict with a national law
that would forbid. However, the Commission has adopted a
different attitude in relation to exemptions under Article
85(3), and not surprisingly the Member States are now wary
in relation to exemptions under the proposed Regulation.
f. The division of power between the Commission and the
Council in the decision-making process envisaged in the
draft Regulation: the real decision-making power lies com-
pletely with the Commission as the guardian of Community
interests. Under the latest amendment to the draft, Member
State participation would be limited to being represented on
the Advisory Committee that would consider a draft deci-
sion, and having its representative's opinion recorded in the
minutes, which would be annexed to the draft decision but
would not be published. This seems unlikely to satisfy the
Council.
There have been no indications of late that these
problems are likely to be resolved soon. The Commission
stated in its Sixteenth Report on Competition Policy that no
progress had been made in 1986 towards dealing with the out-
standing issues, 91 and in spite of some apparent political move-
ment subsequent to the Philip Morris judgment,92 there are no
signs of progress on the technical aspects. The prospects for
the adoption of the draft Regulation must therefore still be re-
garded as somewhat bleak. No doubt it was this realization
that led the European Parliament (admittedly before the Philip
Morris judgment) to advise the Commission to withdraw its
proposal from the Council "in order that a fresh start can be
made on filling this gap in the Community's competition pol-
icy." 93 Whatever this may mean exactly, it clearly refers to the
use of means already within the Commission's grasp. How-
91. COMM'N, SIXTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 38 (1987).
92. British American Tobacco Co. Ltd. & R.J. Reynolds Industries Inc. v. Com-
mission, Joined Cases 142 and 156/84, 1987 E.C.R. _; see infra notes 147-54 and
accompanying text.
93. Resolution on the Fifteenth Report of the Commission of the European
Communities on Competition Policy 29 (1986), reprinted in COMM'N, SIXTEENTH RE-
PORT ON COMPETITION POLICY annex (1987).
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ever, it can hardly be hoped that as satisfactory and systematic
a regime of merger control as that envisaged by the Regulation
can be achieved by the use of tools not designed for that pur-
pose.
V. PARTIAL MERGERS/JOINT VENTURES
Parallel with the developments-or lack of them-in the
merger sphere outlined above, the Commission has been de-
veloping a body of case law in the area of joint ventures. The
Court of Justice has not yet been asked to review any of these
decisions. The purpose of this Part is not to examine in detail
all aspects of these cases, 94 but simply to review those develop-
ments that have a bearing on the merger question.
The structural aspects of joint ventures have caused par-
ticular problems in the Commission's analysis of these ar-
rangements. The efforts to distinguish between joint ventures
that should be regarded as partial mergers on the one hand,
and those that are really restrictive agreements on the other,
has been described by one author as "the 'Partial Merger' Im-
broglio." 95
It certainly must be admitted that a daunting degree of
complexity has characterized the Commission's approach to
this difficult area. This is explained by the absence of a power
of merger control, which might reasonably have been expected
to result in a lack of jurisdiction to control the structural as-
pects of joint ventures, and the Commission's efforts to over-
come this deficiency.
A number of definitions of joint ventures have been put
forward. Brodley has defined them as:
an integration of operations between two or more separate
firms, in which the following conditions are present:
(1) the enterprise is under the joint control of the parent
firms, which are not under related control;
(2) each parent makes a substantial contribution to the
joint enterprise;
94. For a succinct explanation of the Commission's overall approach to joint
ventures, see FaullJoint Ventures Under the EEC Competition Rules, 5 EUR. COMPETITION
L. REV. 358 (1984); Temple Lang, European Community Antitrust Law and Joint U.C.
Ventures Involving Transfer of Technology, in 1982 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 203 (B. Hawk
ed. 1983).
95. 2 B. HAWK, supra note 39, at 260.
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(3) the enterprise exists as a business entity separate from
its parents; and
(4) the joint venture creates significant new enterprise ca-
pability in terms of new productive capacity, new tech-
nology, a new product, or entry into a new market.96
The Commission, for its part, has contented itself with
saying simply that a joint venture is "generally defined as an
enterprise subject to joint control by two or more undertakings
which are economically independent of each other. ' 97 The
Commission has included within this definition joint buying
agencies, joint selling agencies, and joint R&D companies,
as well as more separate entities with an independent eco-
nomic life of their own. The range of possible arrangements
that come under the umbrella of "joint venture" is indeed very
broad. However, they all have one feature in common-their
creation results from a pooling of resources by the parent
companies. Structurally, therefore, they may be regarded as
a merger, 98 or, since only a part of the parents' resources is
merged, what is frequently called in the EEC a "partial
merger." This does not of course prevent them from also hav-
ing anti-competitive aspects in the cartel sense; there may be-
and often are-express or implied undertakings not to com-
pete or other restrictive engagements entered into by the par-
ent companies. The "chameleon-like" nature of a joint ven-
ture should not be understood as placing it definitely and for
all purposes in either category "A" (mergers) or category "B"
(cartels); the same arrangement may belong to both categories
if it manifests characteristics of both. However, unlike the situ-
ation under United States law where the same joint venture
96. Brodley,Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1526 (1982)
(footnote omitted).
97. COMM'N, FOURTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 37 (1975); COMM'N,
THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 53 (1984).
98. This idea is dealt with in Mead, The Competitive Significance ofJoint Ventures, 12
ANTITRUST BULL. 819, 822 (1967), where he examines the possible distinction be-
tween mergers and joint ventures, and concludes that "in substance, the distinction
between mergers and joint ventures may not be significant." Kaysen and Turner
describe joint ventures as "a form of quasi-merger." C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTI-
TRUST POLICY - AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 136 (1959).The same terminol-
ogy is used by Pitofsky, Joint Ventures under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the
Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1007 (1969). Brodley considers joint ven-
tures less restrictive than mergers and therefore deserving of milder antitrust treat-
ment. See Brodley, supra note 96, at 1529.
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may be scrutinized both under the anti-merger provisions and
under the cartel prohibition, 99 EEC law suffers from a handi-
cap in having no anti-merger provisions.
Under the ECSC Treaty it has been possible for the Com-
mission to treat ajoint venture-for example, ajoint buying or
selling agency-as being primarily in the nature of a coopera-
tion agreement in relation to which the aspect ofjoint control
was of secondary importance, and therefore to apply Article 65
of the ECSC Treaty. Alternatively, the Commission could ana-
lyze the arrangement as a concentration to be scrutinized
under Article 66, with Article 65 being applied only to collat-
eral restrictive agreements going beyond the creation of the
joint venture. Thus the analytical distinction between cartels
and changes brought about in the market due to structural al-
terations has been preserved, while at the same time both anal-
yses have been applied to the relevant aspects of the same ar-
rangement.
In the case of the EEC Treaty, the approach has been dif-
ferent. In the absence of a merger control provision, the ten-
dency has been to bring all joint ventures between potential
competitors under the cartel prohibition with the consequence
that, in order to be lawful, they need an exemption pursuant to
Article 85(3). In expending considerable effort to the end of
defining away the merger aspects of joint ventures (and thus
avoiding the label "partial merger") the Commission appears
to have proceeded upon the assumption that an admission of
the merger-type nature of the creation of a joint venture would
prevent it from dealing with the matter at all under Article 85,
even where restrictions of competition were also entered into.
Furthermore, and somewhat contradictorily, once practically
all joint ventures have been classified as restrictive agreements,
the Commission's approach has allowed it to exercise a power
of merger control in this area.
99. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964), held that both
section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), which applies, inter alia, to restric-
tive agreements, and section 7 of the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 670, 671-72
(1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), which applies to
the anti-competitive (structural) effects of mergers, were applicable to joint ventures.
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A. Early Developments
In its Fourth Report on Competition Policy the Commis-
sion stressed the importance of deciding whether a joint ven-
ture was more in the nature of a cartel or a concentration, and
it explained its approach to the question. It first stated that
"Article 85 is clearly applicable to joint arrangements which,
however these may be referred to by the parties, amount to
cooperation agreements."' 100 As in the case of the ECSC
Treaty, joint sales agencies, for instance, would thus be
brought under the rules applicable to cartels in general. This
is what one would expect, for the essential nature of such ar-
rangements is that the parent companies restrict their freedom
of entrepreneurial action by agreeing to cooperate with one
another rather than compete. However, the Commission con-
tinued:
In its 1966 memorandum on the problem of concentration
in the common market, the Commission stated, particularly
in relation to joint ventures, that careful attention should be
paid to whether the parties concerned were applying agree-
ments or concerted practices, especially in cases in which
economically independent undertakings remained in the
market following a concentration. In other words, where
the formation of ajoint venture amounts to a concentration
between each of the parties and the new undertaking, with-
out the founding parties being concentrated as between
each other, the latter may end up by regulating their con-
duct in accordance with policy lines jointly determined in
the interest of the operation of the new joint venture. Even
in the absence of particularized agreements or concerted
practices, it can be assumed that restrictive arrangements
are more likely to be made in cases in which the parties in-
volved are in effect competitors. A restrictive effect which
could in such circumstances jeopardize the economic inde-
pendence of the parties is also referred to as "group ef-
fect."''
The development of ideas is interesting. From the 1966
study's concern that agreements or concerted practices might
exist side by side with the creation of the joint venture as such,
the Commission passed to the somewhat vaguer notion of the
100. COMM'N, FOURTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 38 (1975).
101. Id. 39.
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parent companies "ending up" by regulating their conduct in a
certain way. The impression that this might refer to decisions
arrived at unilaterally by each of the parents rather than to
agreed behavior tends to be confirmed by the subsequent ref-
erence to the absence of "particularized agreements" or even of
concerted practices. In the absence of either of these phenomena,
it might be thought that one was outside the realm of collu-
sion, but doubt remains, for in the next phrase the Commis-
sion speaks of "restrictive arrangements" being made. Doubt
is dispelled, however, by the last sentence quoted above which
refers to "group effect", i.e., the possible impact of group con-
trol on the competitive behavior of the parent companies.
This is clearly a structural phenomenon rather than the result
of agreement between the parties. In fact, each parent under-
taking is assumed to modify its own behavior in response to its
(now altered) own commercial interests. The concept of group
effect is well known in the context of the ECSC Treaty, and
there it has been treated as a concentration phenomenon, i.e., a
possible result of factual circumstances, rather than the prod-
uct of a cartel agreement.10 2
It seems, therefore, that by 1974 the Commission had
determined to bring the very creation of the joint venture and
its structural consequences within the ambit of Article 85 by
denying a "merger" characterization to these phenomena and
dealing with them as if they were the product of a restrictive
agreement. It exempted from this treatment, however, those
joint ventures the creation of which amounted to a total inte-
gration of the parent companies, where they had transferred
all their assets to the joint venture and had become manage-
ment holding companies. 103 Moreover, in a case concerning a
partial integration of the parent companies' assets and activi-
ties, SHV/Chevron, 10 4 the Commission granted negative clear-
ance on the basis that the parents had transferred to theirjoint
ventures all their own former capacity to act on the relevant
markets, although they retained their own economic activities
in other fields. In this case, SHV (a Dutch group with diversi-
fied interests in the coal industry, chain stores, and transport)
102. See, e.g., SIDMAR III, O.J. L 717/67 (1967).
103. See Agfa/Gevaert and Dunlop/Pirelli, discussed in COMM'N, FOURTH REPORT
ON COMPETITION POLICY 40 (1975).
104. SHV/Chevron, OJ. L 38/14 (1975), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9709.
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and Chevron (a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of
California) had set up, through a joint holding company, a
number of subsidiaries, all known as Calpam, in which each
party had an equal holding. The subsidiaries were to sell cer-
tain petroleum products in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxem-
bourg, Germany and Denmark, where SHV and Chevron had
previously had independent distribution networks. The par-
ents transferred to the Calpam subsidiaries, for a period of at
least fifty years, their distribution networks and all assets relat-
ing thereto (plant, equipment, etc.).
In its decision the Commission stated that most aspects of
the transaction suggested that the formation of the joint sub-
sidiaries would result in an extensive concentration of opera-
tions relating to the distribution of Chevron and SHV products
in the new Calpam trading structure. The agreements showed
that there would be a permanent modification of market struc-
tures especially because SHV would no longer be in business
as an independent wholesale buyer of petroleum products.
SHV and Chevron, having divested themselves of their individ-
ual distribution systems, would no longer retail the relevant
product separately. The fact that the joint subsidiaries had
been set up for a fifty-year period was regarded as strong evi-
dence that the assets in question were to be transferred perma-
nently to the Calpam companies.
It should be noted that the "partial merger" characteriza-
tion of the joint venture led the Commission to grant negative
clearance even though the creation of the joint venture was ac-
companied by non-competition clauses. In this regard the
Commission said:
As regards distribution of the products covered by the
agreement, Chevron and SHV have each agreed not to
compete with the other without the prior consent of the
other. This clause provides SHV with the assurance that
the assets transferred by it to the joint subsidiaries will not
lose value as a result of competition by Chevron with those
subsidiaries. In view of the fact that Chevron has no indus-
trial or commercial interest which could imaginably lead it
to compete with its own 50%-owned subsidiaries, and given
also that SHV will disappear as an independent wholesaler
on the petroleum product market, with no likelihood of ever
returning, the clause in question cannot be said to involve
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an appreciable restriction of competition.' 0 5
There is a certain contradiction in this analysis, since the
Commission first finds that Chevron's undertaking not to com-
pete is valuable to SHV, but goes on to decide that the clause
is really of no effect because Chevron has no interest in com-
peting with its joint venture. The general burden of the find-
ing, however, seems to be that neither Chevron nor SHV could
be expected to compete with the joint venture in any event, so
that the clauses restraining them from doing so did not consti-
tute "appreciable" restrictions of competition.
One may wonder about this judgment, especially in the
case of Chevron, which remained active in the petroleum field
generally and which might have found it beneficial at a later
stage to re-enter competition on the distribution market. This
idea is borne out not only by the economic observation that it
would benefit to the extent of 100% from any extra profit
made on its own account, while it received only 50% of the
profits of the joint ventures, but also by the Commission's find-
ing that the clause restraining Chevron from competing pro-
vided SHV with a certain assurance as to its future conduct.
Put another way, the situation might be seen as one in which
there remained restrainable competition, and the non-compe-
tition clause served the purpose of restraining it.
However, it does appear that SHV, while retaining some
oil exploration licenses, for all intents and purposes had disap-
peared from the market altogether. It may be that the Com-
mission was content to observe that there was no potential
competition between the parent companies that could be affected by
the transaction, even in terms of "group effect," since one of
them had removed itself not only from the relevant market but
also from all connected markets on which a "spillover" effect
might have been felt.
It seems odd that the Commission should, on the one
hand, engage in the merger-type analysis involved in ensuring
that a given structural change on one market will not weaken
competition on another, while at the same time ignoring an
explicit restriction of competition on the immediately relevant
105. Id. at 15, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9709, at 9575.
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market that could well result in the presence of only one enter-
prise where there might have been two.
B. The Tests of a "Partial Merger"
Any impression that might have been given by
SHV/Chevron that the "partial merger" theory would provide a
generous exemption from the application of Article 85 to joint
ventures was soon put to rout. In the Sixth Report on Compe-
tition Policy the Commission stated that where a transfer of
assets to a joint venture was limited to a part of the total busi-
ness of the parent companies, it would be treated in the same
way as a merger only in "exceptional cases." These excep-
tional cases could be taken to arise only where:
the parent companies completely and irreversibly abandon
business in the area covered by the joint venture, and pro-
vided that the pooling of certain areas of business does not
weaken competition in other areas, and particularly in re-
lated areas, where the firms involved remain formally in-
dependent of each other.1 0 6
The two tests thus enunciated have remained central to
the Commission's thinking. Not surprisingly, few joint ven-
tures have satisfied them. In fact there has not been a single
formal decision since SHV/Chevron in which the Commission
has held that a joint venture did not fall under Article 85 be-
cause of its essentially concentrative character, although two
informal decisions to that effect have been mentioned in the
Reports on Competition Policy. 107
Under the first test, the Commission's position is that a
merger has not taken place unless the parent companies, or at
least one of them, have divested themselves of the power to
compete, even potentially, on the joint venture's market. A
first essential requirement, therefore, is that all assets con-
106. COMM'N, SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 55 (1977).
107. The first was Kaiser/Estel, discussed in COMM'N, NINTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 131 (1980), which concerned the pooling of the European aluminium
businesses of the parents. The second was the case of Forgemasters, discussed in
COMM'N, TWELIrH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 100 (1983), ajoint venture set
up by two British steel firms in the forgings and castings sector; the Commission
stated that the two parent companies were to withdraw completely from the busi-
nesses in which the joint venture was to operate and they did not compete in the
supply of intermediate products.
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nected with activity on that market be vested in the joint ven-
ture. Even this, however, may not be enough if the parent
companies could reasonably return to the market in question.
In De Laval/Stork, 1°8 where the parents were found to have re-
mained competitors on the joint venture's market, the Com-
mission said:
[I]t is not the case that at least one of the companies has
completely and irreversibly abandoned business in the area
covered by the joint venture nor that it is certain that the
pooling of this area of business will [not] weaken competi-
tion in other areas, particularly in related industries, where
the firms involved remain formally independent of each
other.
To be regarded as having completely and irreversibly
abandoned business in the areas covered by the joint ven-
ture, the parties would have had to have given up all their
existing capacity to compete actually or potentially and to
have ceased to do business in the industry. 'The withdrawal
would have had to have been completely irreversible so that
they could no longer be regarded as actual or potential
competitors. 109
The reference to the possibility that only one of the parent
companies might be required to have disappeared from the
market is interesting. It seems to be based on the underlying
idea that the parent companies must not remain actual or po-
tential competitors of one another; if one of them is definitively
removed from the market in question, that requirement is sat-
isfied. It is not clear, however, how two companies can be
deemed to have merged their interests in the thoroughgoing
way apparently required by the Commission if one of them re-
mains active, or potentially so, on the relevant market.
This problem, however, has not arisen often, and where it
has its solution remains obscure. It has already been seen that
in SHV/Chevron only SHV's departure from the market seems
to have had the definitive character now required by the Com-
mission, but no analysis of this point appears in the decision.
In Kaiser/Estel,"° the very brief report of it states that one of
108. De Laval/Stork, O.J. L 215/11 (1977), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9972.
109. Id. 5, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9972, at 10,076-77.
110. Kaiser/Estel, discussed in COMM'N, NINTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
131 (1980).
EEC MERGERS AND JOINT VENTURES
the two founder firms, Estel, would totally and definitively dis-
appear from the aluminium market, but does not reveal what
the Commission's conclusions were in relation to the other
parent.
In most cases, joint ventures failed the first test because
the parent companies were actual or potential competitors on
the joint venture's market. In De Laval/Stork the parents re-
mained on neighbouring product and geographical markets,
and there were no insurmountable barriers to their return to
the joint venture's market. In Kewa, "' a case concerning the
formation of a joint venture by Bayer, Hoechst, Gelsenberg
and Nukem, the four parents were held to be potential compet-
itors on the joint venture's market although they had not
theretofore been active on it. In the two Vacuum Interrupters
cases, 1 2 it was found that the parents had the technical and
financial resources that would enable them to enter the market
of the joint venture. Rockwell/Iveco 11 3 concerned a joint ven-
ture between parents that, prior to the agreement setting it up,
already manufactured the products that the joint venture was
to produce in the future and that, because of other interests
retained by them, could return to this market in the future.
Those joint ventures that satisfy the first test still have to
negotiate the exceedingly difficult hurdle of the second: the
pooling of certain areas of business must not weaken competi-
tion in areas outside the field of the joint venture. Thus, if the
parents remain competitors in other areas, and particularly in
respect of related products, these must be, as they were in
SHV/Chevron, "technically and economically distinct from the
market in which the joint venture operate[s] and independent
of that market."' "1
4
In Bayer/Gist-Brocades, 1 " the Commission opposed the for-
mation of joint ventures to which the parents would have
transferred their facilities for the manufacture of two products,
raw penicillin and an intermediate product. One of the Com-
111. Kewa, O.J. L 51/15 (1976), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9807.
112. Vacuum Interrupters, O.J. L 48/32 (1977), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
9926; O.J. L 383/1 (1980), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10, 296.
113. OJ. L 224/19 (1983), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,509.
114. COMM'N, SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 56 (1977).
115. Bayer/Gist-Brocades, O.J. L 30/13 (1976), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
9658.
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mission's reasons for objecting was that, in view of the eco-
nomic importance of earlier production stages, the parents'
participation in the joint venture would have led to coopera-
tion between them on the market for processed penicillin and
final products, where they remained competitors.
The Commission seems to have continued its insistence
on the importance of markets other than that on which the
joint venture will operate in the recent case of Himont."16 In
that case, the joint venture represented a pooling of the
parents' assets in the polypropylene sector. Under the agree-
ments as originally drafted, Himont was to engage in the
production of polypropylene resins (worldwide) and in poly-
propylene fibre production (in the EEC). Both parents-
Hercules and Montedison-were to retain some of their capac-
ity in certain areas of the polypropylene sector downstream of
the joint venture's resins market. Montedison was to remain
on an upstream market, and Hercules on the fibres market in
the U.S. The Commission asked for modifications, and under
the new version of the agreements Hercules and Montedison
"abandoned all direct activities within the EEC in the down-
stream market of Himont."117 Himont's activities were reorga-
nized so that they no longer included fibre production. There
is no discussion of what happened in relation to Montedison's
upstream activities, but the Commission concluded that the
parent companies no longer operated in sectors related to that
of the joint venture "except for activities of minor economic
importance in relation to Himont's operations." ' 1 8 There was
also no longer any coincidence between the parents' activities
and those of the joint venture.
In this case, however, the Commission's conclusion that
the creation of the joint venture did not fall under Article 85
was also based upon a singular (and apparently new) develop-
ment. To persuade the Commission to view the joint venture
as a partial merger, the parties agreed to alter its fifty-fifty na-
ture; 20% of Himont's common stock was floated to the pub-
116. This case did not lead to a formal decision, but the Commission issued a
press release on March 26, 1987. Comm'n Press Release, IP(87) 128, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 10,870.
117. Id. at 12,109.
118. Id. at 12,110.
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lic."' 9 The Commission apparently felt that this gave it a desir-
able independence from its parents. It is not clear, however,
how a company, owned by its parents as to 80% of its stock,
can be seen as independent of them in any real sense, and in
the absence of a reasoned decision setting out the Commis-
sion's thinking, it is impossible to know whether yet another
taxing requirement is to be added to the two already outlined.
C. Problems with the Tests
It is clear that the Commission's tests to establish whether
a "partial merger" may be said to have taken place are ex-
tremely difficult to satisfy. It may also be asked whether they
are logically directed at identifying a particular category of
joint ventures that are in reality mergers: what, after all, has a
structural change on one market to do with deciding whether a
pooling of resources on another market is in fact a merger?
Even the requirement that the parent companies should have
irreversibly withdrawn from the joint venture's market can
only be understood in the context of the assumption that joint
ventures have to be rigidly divided into two different catego-
ries, some being mergers and others restrictive agreements.
Otherwise it would seem possible to acknowledge the es-
sentially structural (or merger-like) nature of the operation
whereby the joint venture is set up, whether or not the parents
remain potential competitors, and nevertheless to inquire
whether, apart from these structural aspects, restrictive agree-
ments or understandings have been entered into.
Apart from the narrowness and problematic logic of the
"partial merger" tests, 'their application can give rise to a con-
siderable degree of confusion. Thus, for instance, a number of
the cases referred to above, in particular Kewa, Rockwell/Iveco,
and Vacuum Interrupters, show that there is a dual purpose in the
"potential competition" criterion: before establishing that par-
ent companies remain competitors after the formation of the
joint venture, and that therefore no merger has taken place, it
is necessary to show that they were at least potential competi-
tors beforehand. But the tenor of the decisions, which is re-
flected in all the cases since De Laval-Stork, 2 ' is such that this
119. Id. at 12,109.
120. See Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra, O.J. L 41/31 (1987), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
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inquiry is made primarily in order to establish simply whether
the parents could have entered the joint venture's market
themselves, so that their failure to do so constitutes a loss of
competition on that market.
Thus, in Rockwell/Iveco the joint venture was founded to
manufacture and sell rear-drive axles for heavy commercial ve-
hicles. Since, prior to the agreement, both parents had manu-
factured this product, the supply structure of the market was
found to be altered by the formation of the joint venture be-
cause it was judged that the parents had forgone the opportu-
nity of manufacturing individually the products in question
and selling them in competition with one another.
To the difficulty of keeping separate in one's mind these
different uses of the concepts of "competition" and "potential
competition" is added a further puzzlement, also illustrated by
Rockwel/Iveco: how to reconcile the conclusion that a competi-
tion loss has resulted from the replacement of two enterprises
by one with the Commission's other conclusion-that the par-
ents remained potential competitors. Were there (at least po-
tentially) three competitors on the market, or only one? Per-
haps this difficulty can be resolved textually by answering that
there remained three potential competitors, but the Commis-
sion's concern was that in all likelihood two of them would not
compete. That still leaves the substantive question, however,
whether-if it was extremely unlikely that the parents would
compete with the joint venture and therefore with one an-
other-it would not have been reasonable to treat them as hav-
ing effectively merged all their interests in the area of the joint
venture. In other words, it seems unsatisfactory-and contrary
to the Commission's declared policy-to find that parent com-
panies have withdrawn from the market and will in all
probability not return, and at the same time to deny that a
merger has taken place.
This apparent contradiction also appears in De Laval/
Stork, GEC/Weir, and Langenscheidt/Hachette, since in all three
10,852; Optical Fibres, O.J. L 236/30 (1986), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,813;
Amersham Buchler, O.J. L 314/34 (1982), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,431;
Langenscheidt/Hachette, OJ. L 39/25 (1982), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,350;
Sopelem/Vickers, O.J. L 70/47 (1978), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,014; GEC-
Weir Sodium Circulators, O.J. L 327/26 (1977), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,000.
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cases the Commission found that the supply structure had
been altered by the replacement of two enterprises by just one,
and yet did not treat them as cases of merger. This could be
interpreted as a further illustration of the Commission's re-
strictive attitude to the characterization of joint ventures as
partial mergers.
D. The Result
In reality, however, the problem of confusion, like those of
the narrowness and lack of consequence of the tests applied,
derives from the fact that the Commission has been grappling
with the difficulties inherent in a situation in which, on the one
hand, it has felt constrained from applying Article 85 to merg-
ers as such, while on the other the competitive disadvantages
that it perceives in joint ventures derive largely from structural
considerations. In the result, it has defined "partial mergers"
as a very small category, and then gone on to apply Article 85
to all other joint ventures largely in a spirit of concentration
control. Thus, some of the inquiries the Commission makes
under Article 85(1) are as follows:
1. Will the establishment of the joint venture lead to a
reduction in the number of competitors on that market?
Or to a diminution of competitive enthusiasm? Although
the Commission usually says that a parent will never com-
pete with its joint venture, it nevertheless appears some-
times to conclude that the parents will continue to be
present on the joint venture's market but that their partici-
pation in the joint venture will lead them to coordinate
their own conduct, for example, WANO Schwarzpulverl2"
and GEC/Weir.122
2. Will there be a reduction of competition on other mar-
kets as a result of the parents' cooperation in the joint ven-
ture?
3. Will third party competition be affected, for example,
by foreclosure of market opportunities?
121. WANO Schwarzpulver, OJ. L 322/26 (1978), 2(a), Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 10,089.
122. GEC/Weir Sodium Circulators, O.J. L 327/26 (1977), 2(a)(i), Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,000, at 10,136.
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4. Will entry barriers be raised?
Under Article 85(3) the Commission continues its struc-
tural analysis on the basis of the questions whether the restric-
tion of competition involved in the joint venture is indis-
pensable to the benefit to be achieved 23 and whether the
agreement affords the parties the possibility of eliminating
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question. 2 4 These questions enable the Commission to
examine, again, whether the parent companies would have
entered the market in the absence of the joint venture, whether
the benefits of the joint venture could not be achieved by some
other arrangement that is regarded as less likely to prejudice
patterns of competition, and whether-in view of the number
of firms, competing technologies, and so on-the market
strength of the joint venture is likely to be excessive.
What is noteworthy in this development is the structural na-
ture of the analysis. It must sound entirely normal to an Amer-
ican audience to hear of the Commission inquiring whether the
formation of a joint venture is likely to lead to a loss of compe-
tition in the sense that, without the joint venture, one or both
parents might have entered the market alone. Nevertheless, it
should be remembered that in the United States that familiar
process of analysis is carried out under the merger rationale of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 1 25 The achievement of the Com-
mission in this field is that, without merger control provisions,
and in spite of the theory that it does not apply Article 85 to
joint ventures that are really mergers, it has developed its rea-
soning in such a way as to allow it effectively to exercise a kind
of merger control on the basis of a cartel prohibition.
This result, however, is not without its disadvantages.
Apart from the problems already outlined, it means that virtu-
ally all joint venture agreements between competitors or
potential competitors are brought under the prohibition of Ar-
123. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 85(3)(a), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 at 32-33,
298 U.N.T.S. at 48.
124. Id., art. 85(3)(b).
125. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 670, 671-72 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); see, e.g., Yamaha Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 657
F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982); United States v. Penn-Olin
Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963), vacated, 378 U.S. 158 (1964), on remand,
246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 308 (1967).
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ticle 85 because of predictions as to the likely effects of their
existence on the competitive structure. These types of estima-
tions, when applied to mergers in jurisdictions that have
merger control laws, are never used to outlaw all mergers,
even between competitors. It is accepted that a merger leaves
only one operator on the market where before there were two
or more, and this phenomenon is not regarded as unlawful. It
is only when an unacceptable degree of market concentration
results from a merger that it is prohibited. This would also be
the case under the proposed Regulation on Control of Con-
centrations. Yet in relation to joint ventures, at least where the
parents are potential competitors, this type of analysis leads to
a prohibition in principle under Article 85(1), regardless of
market strength and of whether the competitive structure is
damaged by the accumulation of too much power. This imbal-
ance seems curious, not to say harsh.
A further difficulty lies in the nature of Article 85: being a
cartel prohibition that allows for the possibility of exemption
of restrictive agreements where they produce benefits that out-
weigh the advantages of free competition, Article 85 is not ide-
ally suited to the "balancing" analysis carried out in joint ven-
ture cases, whereby in effect the Commission assesses the rela-
tive competitive benefits of two different structural situations
(the market with and without the joint venture). Article 85's
two-tiered approach, under which an agreement has first to be
found to be prohibited under paragraph 1 before it can be ex-
empted under paragraph 3, leads to odd results in the context
of joint ventures. Thus, in order to bring a joint venture
agreement under Article 85(1), the Commission has to find
that it results in a loss of competition because the parents
could have entered the market separately. But in granting an
exemption, in order to say that the agreement is indispensable
to the benefits to be achieved, the Commission generally con-
cludes that the parent companies would not have been likely to
enter the joint venture's market alone, 26 or at least that they
would not have been as dynamic or successful as the joint ven-
126. See, e.g., Langenscheidt/Hachette, OJ. L 39/25 (1982), Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 10,350; GEC/Weir Sodium Circulators, OJ. L 327/26 (1977), Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,000; Vacuum Interrupters, O.J. L 48/32 (1977), Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9926.
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ture. 27 This begs the question as to how real the "potential
competition" between the parents was in the first place. It
seems a pity that the "competition loss" should be found to be
a competition gain only at the exemption stage, given the small
number of agreements that are likely to receive formal exemp-
tions and the problems of civil liability and nullity connected
with the formal illegality of all the others.
Commission statements in the last couple of years have
tended to emphasize the generally pro-competitive nature of
joint ventures, recognizing them as positive structural adjust-
ments to the requirements of the market place.1 28 There
seems to be a general acceptance that too many of them have
been outlawed. 29 Concrete recognition of their real nature
and merits could consist in drawing a distinction between the
agreement to establish a joint venture and restrictive obliga-
tions that may accompany that agreement.
VI. RECENT INDICATIONS IN RELATION TO MERGERS
It will be recalled that in the 1966 Memorandum the Com-
mission concluded that Article 85 did not apply to agreements
for the sale and purchase of shares. However, two cases de-
cided in 1984 indicate that the Commission's view is no longer
so straightforward, and that the approach it has adopted in
joint venture cases has also filtered through to the general area
of mergers. Moreover, the judgment of the Court ofJustice in
the Philip Morris case indicates that Article 85 may apply at least
to some such agreements.
127. See, e.g., Rockwell/Iveco, OJ. L 224/19 (1983), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,509; Amersham Buchler, OJ. L 314/34 (1982), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,431; Sopelem/Vickers, O.J. L 70/47 (1978), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,0 14;
De Laval/Stork, O.J. L 215/11 (1977), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9972.
128. COMM'N, THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 53 (1984); Suth-
erland, Towards Positive Guidelines on Joint Ventures, Remarks at Eighth Annual
Competition Law Conference, European Study Conferences (Brussels, Nov. 7, 1985)
[hereinafter Sutherland Speech] (available at the Fordham International Law Journal of-
fice).
129. Thus the declared intention to be "realistic" in relation to findings of po-
tential competition, COMM'N, THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 55
(1984), and, even more telling, Commissioner Sutherland's question, "Have we
stretched Article 85 too far?", Sutherland Speech, supra note 128, at 17.
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A. Mecaniver/PPG
The Commission decision in Mecaniver/PPG130 concerned
the purchase by PPG, an American producer of flat glass al-
ready present on the EEC market, of an 81% holding in Bous-
sois, a French glass company, as well as controlling interests in
seven export sales companies. The Commission treated the
matter as a "transfer of a business"' 3' (from the previous
owner Mecaniver, a member of the BSN Group) and granted
negative clearance. What is interesting, however, is that it did
so in terms that implied that even a share purchase agreement
may fall under Article 85(1) in certain circumstances. It
stressed that the minority shareholding retained by Mecaniver
in Boussois did not give rise to any possibility of its influencing
Boussois's competitive behavior, and that its relatively small
shareholding in another glass company did not give it control
there either. 32 The Commission's concern seems to have
been to ensure that there could be no joint control of Boussois
by PPG and Mecaniver (presumably because this might have
led them to coordinate their behavior elsewhere) and that Me-
caniver did not simultaneously have control or influence in
more than one glass undertaking, the competitive behavior of
which it could then have coordinated.
The latter point is particularly striking. The Commission
seems to be saying that precisely a merger phenomenon (the
possibility of determining the behavior of companies in which
an undertaking has majority shareholdings, or other forms of
control) would bring an otherwise innocent agreement under
Article 85. The implication is that share purchase agreements
will escape Article 85 only if they do not give rise to structural
situations in which companies might tend to coordinate their
behavior, even if such coordination is the result of merger.
B. Philip Morris
Philip Morris "' originally concerned an agreement under
which Rembrandt, a South African firm, sold to Philip Morris
130. Mecaniver/PPG, O.J. L 35/54 (1985), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,650.
131. Id. 13, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,650, at 11,545-8.
132. Id. 14, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,650, at 11,545-9.
133. Discussed in COMM'N, FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY §§ 98-
100 (1985).
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("PM"), a U.S. corporation with substantial interests in the cig-
arette industry, one half of its shares in its wholly owned sub-
sidiary, Rothmans Tobacco Holdings Ltd. ("RTH"), which in
turn held a controlling interest in Rothman's International
P.L.C. ("RI").' 34 PM and Rembrandt also entered into a part-
nership agreement providing for cooperation in the conduct of
RI's affairs.1 35 The subsidiaries of RI and PM are direct com-
petitors on the oligopolistic EEC cigarette market, with RI hav-
ing a market share of about 15%, and PM between 12% and
14%. As a result, therefore, one competitor now had a sub-
stantial holding in another.
Because of the complete parity between Rembrandt and
PM on the board of RTH, which in turn controlled RI, it
seemed that PM would be in a position to influence RI's behav-
ior to a considerable degree. The Commission took the view
that, because of the possibility of controlling RI (with Rem-
brandt), and because of its financial interest in RI, PM would
be unlikely to compete with it in as thoroughgoing a manner as
would otherwise be the case.' 3 6 It also felt that PM's share-
holding and influence would prevent RI from competing vigor-
ously against PM. 137 The Commission therefore issued a
Statement of Objections saying that, in all the circumstances,
the agreement providing for the transfer of equity capital to
PM fell under Article 85(1).138 It also considered that Rem-
brandt, through RI, held a dominant position in the Benelux
countries and that the agreements gave rise to an infringement
of Article 86 by effectively neutralizing PM as a competitor of
RI (since it was seen as unlikely that PM would compete with a
company it controlled), thereby strengthening Rembrandt's
dominant position on a substantial part of the Common Mar-
ket. ' 39
After various stages of the administrative procedure had
been completed, the companies involved agreed to change
their agreements. 41 Under the new agreements, PM no
134. Id. 98.
135. Id.
136. Id. 99.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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longer held any share in RTH; instead, Rembrandt transferred
to it a direct holding in RI, representing 24.9% of the voting
rights (though 30.8% of the capital) in that company. 41 Rem-
brandt resumed complete ownership of RTH, and held some
44% of the votes in RI. The partnership agreement was also
abrogated.
In these new circumstances, the Commission decided that
there were no longer grounds for regarding the agreements as
an infringement of either Article 85(1) or Article 86.142 Rem-
brandt was regarded as being once again in a position to exer-
cise effective control over RI without reference to PM. PM had
become no more than a minority shareholder with only the in-
fluence over RI that its voting rights of 24.9% gave it. PM also
undertook not to have any representatives on the board or any
management body of RI. The Commission was no longer per-
suaded, in the new factual situation, that PM's having a sub-
stantial shareholding in RI would prevent it from compet-
ing.143 As for Article 86, once the relationship of control or
decisive influence over RI had been removed, so that it was no
longer possible to regard it as likely that PM would forbear
from competing with RI, the Commission thought it was im-
possible to say that the dominant position held by Rembrandt
(through RI) would be strengthened. 44
The Commission's final decision entailed the rejection
of three complaints it had received from competitors of PM.1 45
Two of these competitors appealed to the Court of Justice
against the Commission's (unpublished) decisions rejecting
their complaints. Before examining the Court's judgment, it is
interesting to note the essence of the Commission's approach
to the agreements in question.
In relation to the original agreements, the Commission
could have concluded that the kind of control over RI's affairs
that PM was likely to have would give rise to a concentration.
In that way, the fact that RI's and PM's affairs would be run in
tandem would have seemed no more than the normal outcome
of a merger operation.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. 100.
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Alternatively, if it was not satisfied that a sufficiently clear
degree of control existed, it could simply have reverted to its
earlier view that Article 85 does not apply to an agreement to
purchase shares. That conclusion need not have been upset by
the existence of the partnership agreement, since this was an
agreement concluded between shareholders about the man-
agement of their respective holdings and not an agreement be-
tween undertakings in their capacity as undertakings on the
cigarette market. It might have been prompted in this direc-
tion by the fact that the circumstances of the case indicated at
least a possibility that PM would wish to purchase further hold-
ings in RI at a later date; if at that point a merger took place,
which would be beyond the reach of Article 85, it might be
thought odd if the earlier agreement (to purchase the first
batch of shares) had been said to fall afoul of that provision.
On the contrary, however, in relation to the original
agreements, the Commission's approach was similar to that
which it adopts in relation to joint ventures: it regarded it as
unlikely that a company that had made a large investment in
another, and that was in a position (jointly) to control that
other, would continue to compete wholeheartedly against it. It
also focused on the opportunities PM and RI would have to
coordinate their conduct on the market. This is reminiscent of
the idea that parent companies will coordinate their own be-
havior as a result of cooperating in the context of the joint ven-
ture, except that here the coordination would have been be-
tween parent and child. Although it placed great emphasis on
the position of strength that PM occupied in relation to RI, and
the likelihood that this would lead to coordination of their ac-
tivities, there was no hint in the Statement of Objections that
the Commission would regard this as a merger (or "partial
merger") operation.
Similarly, in relation to the final agreements, where there
was no joint venture aspect, the Commission's approach was
not to say simply that Article 85 does not apply to share
purchase agreements, but rather to emphasize PM's new status
as a mere minority shareholder and the lack of incentive under
the new arrangements for Rembrandt to coordinate with PM in
exercising its power of control over RI. As to the possibility
that PM would eventually take over RI, again there was no indi-
cation that this would be regarded as beyond the scope of Arti-
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cle 85; on the contrary, the implication seemed to be that, if
this should happen, Article 85 might then become applicable.
The relevant passage of the decision reads as follows:
While these provisions [certain rights of first refusal] give
PM a possibility of modifying in the future its status as a
minority shareholder in order to obtain control of RI, their
existence does not at present have the effect of distorting
competition within the meaning of Article 85.146
In its judgment, the Court decided all the issues in favor
of the Commission. On the facts of the 1984 agreements, the
Court held that the Commission had been justified in taking
the view that there was no infringement of Articles 85 or 86.
However, in the course of arriving at this conclusion the Court
made a series of statements the analysis of which is not easy.
First, the Court made it clear that "the main issue in these
cases is whether and in what circumstances the acquisition of a
minority shareholding in a competing company may constitute an
infringement of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty."14 7 Further-
more, the Court went on to predicate the rest of the judgment
(at least as far as Article 85 was concerned) on the fact that the
companies in question had "remained independent after the entry
into force of the agreements."' 48 One might therefore have
expected merger-type situations to be excluded from the scope
of the judgment.
However, the Court went on to develop guidelines to be
applied in order to determine whether an agreement for the
acquisition of shares is caught by Article 85.149 At this point, it
referred to a number of factors that would normally be
thought to fall squarely within the merger context. The Court
referred to the possibility that an acquisition of shares in a
competitor might "serve as an instrument for influencing the
commercial conduct of the companies in question."' 50 It also
referred to the investigating company acquiring legal or defacto
146. Comm'n, unpublished decision, 24.
147. British American Tobacco Co. Ltd. & R.J. Reynolds Industries Inc. v. Com-
mission, Joined Cases 142 and 156/84, 1987 E.C.R.-,-, 30, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,405, at 17,761 (emphasis added).
148. Id. at-, 31, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405, at 17,761 (emphasis
added).
149. Id. at -, 7 36-40, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405, at 17,761.
150. Id. at -, 37, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405, at 17,761.
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control of the commercial conduct of the other company. 5 '
The Court speaks of an agreement giving the investing com-
pany "the possibility of reinforcing its position at a later stage
and taking effective control of the other company. "152
Were it not for the apparent limitation of the judgment to
a minority acquisition fact situation, 53 it might have been
thought that the Court was laying down a new principle ac-
cording to which Article 85 applies to any agreement by which
one undertaking acquires a holding in another, competing un-
dertaking where that holding has, or is likely to have, anti-com-
petitive effects. An agreement whereby one undertaking ob-
tained a majority interest in another would therefore be cov-
ered. However, the indications that the Court did not intend
to go so far are reinforced by the dictum of the Court to the
effect that the Commission decisions rejecting the complaints
of R.J. Reynolds and British American Tobacco "do not lay
down new principles but are limited essentially to an examina-
tion of the special features of the agreements in question. "154
Now the decision clearly indicated the Commission's view that
Article 85 could apply to share purchase transactions between
competitors, a view that was certainly not uncontroversial. Yet
the Court seems to have considered that the question of the
applicability of Article 85 to share purchase agreements as
such did not give rise to any great new considerations of prin-
ciple. It does not seem possible that it could have thought the
same in relation to applying Article 85 to merger-type agree-
ments. Therefore, in view of the indications that the Court
intended to decide the case on its facts, and that it did not con-
sider itself to be establishing new principles of any magnitude,
it would be unwise to assume that the Philip Morris judgment
can be applied to merger-type agreements.
It must be conceded that the result indicated above seems
paradoxical; a minority acquisition by a competitor would be
caught by Article 85, but not a takeover. The Court would
thus appear to have singled out for the application of Article
85 a category of cases in which one company obtained effective
151. Id. at -, 4 38, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 14,405, at 17,761.
152. Id. at -, 39, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405, at 17,761.
153. Id. at , 4 30-31, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405, at 17,761.
154. Id. at -, 71, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405, at 17,766.
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control of another through a minority shareholding, and in
which the companies therefore remained formally separate in
structure. At first sight it is hard to see what the relevance of
formal "independence" could be, if in fact one company con-
trolled the other, or why it should matter whether the control
was exercised by a blocking minority shareholding or an out-
right majority holding. It also seems odd that an agreement
allowing for an ultimate takeover should fall under Article 85 if
the takeover agreement itself would not. A possible explana-
tion in this regard is that the Court considered the Continental
Can doctrine to be in need of completion; in this perspective,
Article 85 could be applied to agreements preparatory to a
takeover, and Article 86 to the takeover itself where that had
the result of eliminating residual competition.
It cannot be pretended that this judgment leaves the situa-
tion very clear in relation to the application of Article 85 to
share purchase transactions between competitors. As for
merger-type situations, not only do all the objections to the
application of Article 85 hold good, but the Court seems to
have hesitated, for the moment at least, to apply Article 85 to
such transactions.
CONCLUSION
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the absence of a
power of merger control has given rise to unsatisfactory devel-
opments in the area of mergers and partial mergers. A lawyer
trying to advise a client in this context is faced with a formida-
ble task; not only are the signs from the Commission often dif-
ficult to reconcile but also there is now a particularly difficult
judgment of the Court to be construed. In relation to Article
86, the situation is less impenetrable, but it cannot be pre-
tended that it is satisfactory, or that anything less than a spe-
cific and clear merger control provision can lead to a compre-
hensive resolution of the problems in this field.
19881 309
